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I. Introduction
Private organizations have recently established numerous
programs aimed at improving the environmental performance of
industry. Many of the new programs seek to define and enforce
standards for environmental management, and to make it difficult for
producers not to participate in them. They claim, explicitly and
implicitly, to promote the public interest. They take on functions
generally performed by government regulatory programs, and may
change or even displace such programs. Private environmental
regulatory programs thus have the potential to significantly reshape
domestic and international policy institutions by changing the locus,
dynamics, and substance of policymaking.
The expansion of private environmental regulation comes at
a time of growing agreement that environmental goals must be
integrated and pursued in tandem with social and economic ones. The
primary source of this view is the worldwide movement for
"sustainable development," catalyzed and given momentum by the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio
in 1992.1 Government programs to date have a relatively weak record
of defining and pursuing sustainable development. Thus the growth

I

See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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of private regulatory programs offers fresh hope by creating new
institutional arenas in which sustainable development may be defined
and implemented. At the same time, by expanding the arena of action
and potentially changing the rules of engagement, private regulation
also has the potential to deflect the movement for sustainable
development.
With these possibilities in mind, this article reviews three
private environmental regulatory programs:
-- the Forest Stewardship Council's forest and forest product
certification program (FSC)
-- the International Organization for Standardization's "ISO
14000" program
-- the American Forest and Paper Association's Sustainable
Forestry Initiative (AFPA).
The goals of this article are three. The first is to bring these
programs to the attention oflegal scholars and practitioners, who tend
to be more familiar with governmental regulatory programs than
private ones. The second goal is to provide a preliminary assessment
of the programs' implications for the tripartite agenda of sustainable
development. To make this task more tractable, the social dimension
of sustainable development is analyzed in terms of human rights and
community protection, constructs sufficiently familiar in legal
scholarship to provide workable analytical categories.2 Finally, the
article seeks to locate the programs in the larger context of social
policy by describing several difficult questions of equity, law, and
democracy that the programs will have to face if they are to continue
to advance.

The economic dimension of sustainable development, the primary focus
of most private organizations, is treated largely in terms of its relationship to
environment, human rights, and community in this article.
2
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This article analyzes programs applicable to forestry?
Forestry is the industry for which environmental certification
programs appear most organizationally developed, and can be most
meaningfully studied.4 It is a major industry in both developed and
developing countries, and often links them economically. Forest
management is critical both to local environmental conditions, such
as water quality and wildlife habitat, and to global environmental
conditions, such as climate stability. Forestry involves the control of
valuable resources and the doing of difficult and dangerous work,
both of which often give rise to human rights issues. Forests provide
the primary material and symbolic context for many place-based
communities, especially for indigenous ones; how forests are
managed can deeply affect daily life. Finally, forest management
necessarily extends over long time periods. Alternative choices about
how to manage forests can imply radically different futures for
communities and their relationships to the environment.
The FSC is particularly arresting. The diminutive organization
seeks to integrate environmental, human rights, community and
economic goals in a consistent set of substantive standards on a
global scale and to implement them. It pursues these goals in
confidence that widely accepted principles and growing consumer
demand can leverage them into practice. The ISO program also
operates on a global scale, but does not set substantive standards nor
seek to integrate environmental, human rights, and community goals.
Instead, it uses environmental management systems to seek
continuous improvement in environmental performance, and applies

3

It is important to note that the ISO program is also applicable to many

other industries.
There is ahuge and growing array ofenvironmental certification programs
in the world, focusing on everything from organic food to coffee beans to ecotouristry programs and everything in between. The programs discussed in this
article are among the most interesting, and perhaps institutionally significant,
because they seek to shape industrial management practices systematically by
promulgating law-like texts to define management standards for industries and to
organize their operations.
4
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to a wide array of industries. The AF&PA program is limited to
forest-products companies in a single nation and does not link
environmental to human rights and community goals, but it counters
the other programs by defining competing substantive standards and
staking out an independent role for large American forestry
companies. It has important counterparts in a number of other
countries, including Canada and Indonesia, and has recently been
matched and raised by the emergence of a "pan-European"
certification program.'

Because of their novelty and relative obscurity in legal
scholarship, the three programs are described in substantial detail in
this article. Thus, readers who are already knowledgeable or who do
not seek detailed information will want to skim some sections. The
FSC program is examined most thoroughly. The ISO and AF&PA
programs are described somewhat more briefly by comparison and
contrast to the FSC program.
5
A recent report lists a dozen national forestry certification programs
operating in Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and.the USA. See Stephen Bass & Markku
Simula, Independent Certification/VerificationofForestManagement,November
29, 1999, at 11 (background paper prepared for the World Bank/WWF Alliance
Workshop, Washington, D.C., November 9-10, 1999) <http://wwwesd.worldbank.org/wwf/sim-bass.doc> (on file with author). An earlier report also
listed significant national efforts in Belgium, Portugal, and Spain. See Dietrich
Burger & Barbara Von Kruedener, Forest Certification - Status Report and
Overview (February 1998) (report of the Forest Certification Project, Deutsche
Gesellschaft fMr Technische Zusamenarbeit (GTZ - German Organization for
Technical Cooperation, Eschbom, Germany)) (on file with author). Most of the
national programs are off-shoots of the FSC movement or responses to it, but they
all seek to define distinctive national approaches to forest certification. Perhaps
most significantly, the Pan-European Forest Certification Council (PEFC) was
founded in mid-1999. It seeks to link national certification programs in European

countries within a more general framework based on common standard setting,
third-party auditing, certification procedures, and certifier accreditation
requirements. While the PEFC program will clearly be an important force in
coming forest certification developments, it is too new and relatively unformed to
be analyzed in this article. See generally <http://www.pefc.org/content.htm>.
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The programs share many important patterns. They use lawlike texts to organize their own missions and behavior, as well as
those of certifiers and certified organizations. They assume that their
programs can achieve legitimacy based on a commitment to widely
accepted principles implemented by professionals working in a
market framework. And they assume that requiring firms to produce
and analyze information on their environmental performance will lead
to organizational learning and improved performance, even if that
information is not shared with the public or regulatory agencies.
Finally, they rely heavily on preexisting social and economic
networks to amplify their credibility.
The article concludes, among other things, that each of the
programs has some potential for improving the environmental
performance of forest enterprises, but that only the FSC program
offers much hope of strengthening the protection ofhuman rights and
the participation of communities in forest management. Indeed the
ISO and AF&PA programs seem designed to narrow the human
rights concerns that firms must take into account, and to dampen the
participation of communities by helping firms to "manage"
community concerns more effectively. If one program were to prevail
it would likely be the ISO program, based on its superior
organizational and financial resources. However, rather than being
entirely separate, these and other programs compete with and
complement each other in a larger regulatory arena. It is possible that
one or more hybrids combining elements of several programs will
emerge over time.
The conclusion also argues that the private regulatory
programs pose some pressing questions for societal institutions. First
are those of equity and fairness. Many of the benefits of certification
programs have thus far accrued largely to organizations based in
developed countries. Developed countries have also dominated the
development and standard setting processes in certification programs.
The certification programs will have to successfully address equity
questions if they hope to gain worldwide legitimacy.
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Second, certification programs pose important challenges for
traditional legal systems. Because the programs establish independent
standard setting and enforcement processes, legal systems will have
to decide how to deal with them. Regardless of how legal systems
react, substantive legal standards are likely to be affected by
certification systems over time, as private standards suffuse public
ones through environmental regulation, tort law, financial regulation,
and other avenues. It is also possible that, where certification systems
appear to improve the performance of firms, legal systems will
reallocate regulatory resources to other areas. Certification systems
may also create conflicts with some legal policies, particularly in the
area of trade law, and could be subjected to legal regulation over
time.
Finally, the rise ofcertification systems may imply challenges
for conventional definitions of democratic governance. Certification
programs move policy making away from governmental and
intergovernmental organizations and toward non-governmental ones.
They claim democratic legitimacy based on a combination of
expertise, commitment to widely accepted but poorly defined
principles, and participation processes in which they select the
participants. At the same time they tend to internationalize
policymaking. If certification systems prove durable and come to be
widely treated as legitimate, they may contribute to a significant
redefinition of democratic policymaking.
H. The Forest Stewardship Council
A. Mission and Organization
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was founded in 1993 "to
promote environmentally responsible, socially beneficial and
economically viable management of the world's forests, by
establishing a worldwide standard of recognized and respected
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Principles of Forest Management." 6 The mission is highly ambitious.
It seeks not only to combine environmental, social and economic
criteria in the same standard, but also to do so worldwide, thereby
covering very different tropical, temperate, and boreal forests and the
people who live in and near them. 7 To establish its standard the FSC
is building a freestanding, market-driven certification system. The
system will certify both forests and the products that come from
them.
The FSC has its direct origins in discussions among a group
of small-scale North American furniture makers, the Woodworkers'
Alliance for Rain Forest Protection (WARP), who became concerned
about the effects of their exotic hardwood use on tropical rain forests
in the late 1980s. By 1990 they had concluded that a system was
needed for certifying sustainably produced tropical hardwoods, and
that it should be established by environmentalists as quickly as
possible. The idea of a certification system, presumably run by
governmental organizations, had already been proposed to the
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), an
intergovernmental organization charged with developing national
policies for protecting tropical forests! But it had been resisted by

Forest Stewardship Council Principles and Criteria forForest Management
<http://www.fscoax.org/principal.htm> [hereinafter FSC Principles and Criteria].
6

7

When the FSC was founded its mission included certifying "sustainably

managed forests." The FSC has since retreated from the proposition that it can
certify sustainable management on grounds that itmight suffer a loss of credibility
if some certified forests in fact turned out over time not to be sustainable. It has
therefore adopted the term "well-managed forest," with the intent of applying it so
as to achieve sustainable management. Personal communication.
This citation reflects the fact that research for this article was based partly
on personal interviews with participants and knowledgeable observers of the
processes involved. Because not all interviewees agreed to speak for personal
attribution, interview based information is cited as "personal communication."
S
See Chris Elliott, Forest Certification: Analysis from a Policy Network
Perspective 103 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, tcole Polytechnique F~drale
De Lausanne) [hereinafter Elliott, Forest Certification].
The ITTO was established by the International Tropical Timber
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some members as possibly a disguised way of boycotting tropical
timber, and by others as simply unworkable.
Meanwhile many environmental organizations concluded that
the ITTO process had been a failure that would not yield significant
improvements in tropical forest management in an acceptable time
frame. Thus, they adopted and promoted the WARP proposal for a
non-governmental certification scheme.9 The World-Wide Fund for
Nature (WWF), a major international environmental NGO dedicated
to the protection of nature and biological diversity,10 became the
primary promoter of forest certification. Together with the MacArthur
Foundation, the WWF put significant resources behind the project,
resulting in the founding of the FSC in Toronto in 1993. The WWF
thus invested in establishing what it hoped would be a distinct,
durable institutional framework, after which it continued with its
varied activities as a general purpose environmental NGO. I I

Agreement of 1983, which was negotiated under the auspices ofthe United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development. One of its objectives was:
To encourage the development of national policies aimed at sustainable
utilization and conservation of tropical forests and their genetic resources,
and at maintaining the ecological balance in the region concerned. § 1(h).
9
See Elliott, Forest Certification, supra note 8, at 107.
1o
See WWF Website <http://www.wwf.org/>. WWF International was
founded in 1961. National subsidiaries soon followed in the US and UK. It
gradually evolved from an organization devoted to preserving somewhat exotic
wildlife and places to one focusing on nature and biodiversity generally. WWF
International now has an operating budget of over $50,000,000.
<http://www.panda.org/wwf/Report98/accounts.html> . Its four major national
groups have comparable budgets, and its more than twenty smaller national groups
also appear prosperous. The organization is known as the World Wildlife Fund in
the U.S. and Canada.
I
See Claude Welch, Human rights,environment andthe Ogoni: Strategies
for non-governmental organizations,infra p.251 this volume, for an overview of
the common types of activities of NGOs.
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12

The FSC now has over 300 members from over 45 countries.
The members are mostly organizations, but also include a growing
number of individuals.13 The FSC has no official ties to government
agencies, and indeed prohibits them from membership. 4 The
organization accepts government funding on condition that it not be
tied to any restrictions that would affect its independence," and has
accepted a considerable amount over the years, mostly from European
governments.

6

According to its Executive Director, the "FSC is not an
Environmental NGO. FSC operates as a multi-stakeholder
organization, building the interests of all main stakeholder groups
into forest management standards and certification." 1 The political

12
List of FSC Members, FSC Doc.
<http://wwv.fscoax.org/html/5-2-2.html>.

13

5.2.2.

(October

1999)

See id.

See FSC Statutes, Seventh Art. <http://www.fscoax.org/htmll-3.htm>.
Members of government agencies have participated in at least some regional and
national standard setting processes, however, often as technical experts. See e.g.,
Process for Developing FSC Standards for the Maritime Forest Region (visited
May 26, 1999) <http://www.canadian-forests.com/fsc-process.html> [hereinafter
Maritime Process] (on file with author). The International FSC voted in its second
general assembly in June 1999 to examine options for involvement in the FSC by
public sector forest managers who are undergoing certification. See Draft Minutes
of the Forest Stewardship Council General Assembly, Oaxaca, Mexico, June 2425,1999, Motion 5 <http://www.fscoax.org/html/assemblygeneral/fscgamin.htn>
[hereinafter FSC Draft Minutes].
Is
See Forest Stewardship Council A.C. By-Laws, FSC Doc. 1.1 (Ratified,
September 1994; Editorial Revision, October 1996; Revised February 1999). "FSC
will accept contributions from non-governmental organizations, foundations,
government sources, multilateral agencies and individuals, as long as no
restrictions are attached which would affect the independence or integrity of FSC."
<http://www.fscoax.org/html/I- 1.html>.
16
See Chris Elliott & Arlin Hackman, CurrentIssues in ForestCertification,
in CANADA: A WWF CANADA DISCUssION PAPER 5 (1996).
17
Tim Synott, Forest Stewardship Council, AC, in DEFINING A FOREST
14

VISION: WORLD WILDLIFE FUND'S NORTH AMERICAN FORESTS FOR LIFE

CONFERENCE (Kathleen Kessler et al. eds., 1998).
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theory of the FSC can thus be described as "representative
participation." The assumption is that if the proper stakeholders are
represented and participate in decision-making processes, then good
and legitimate decisions will result. 8
Although it is organized as a not-for-profit corporation, the
FSC's structure resembles that of a federalist constitutional
government with formalized corporatisrh. 19 Its central decisionmaking body, the General Assembly, is organized into three
chambers, "environmental," "social," and "economic," with equal
voting power; thus, at least two of the chambers must concur in any
decision.2" Each chamber is further subdivided into a Northern
subchamber, for members from developed countries, and a Southern
subchamber, for members from developing countries. Each
subchamber has halfthe chamber's total voting power.2 Membership
in the FSC is by application to the FSC. In other words, the FSC
is

E.g., Kirsti Thornber et al., Certification: Barriers to Benefits: A
Discussion ofEquity Implications, at 17 (Eur. Forestry Inst. Discussion Paper No.
8, 1999) [hereinafter Thornber, Equity and Certification] (on file with author).
19
Corporatist systems are defined as formally integrating major interest
groups into their political decision-making processes. See DAVID HELD, MODELS
OF DEMOCRACY

(1987). The best known examples are European states, where

labor unions, producer organizations and governments have often negotiated key
policies. See PATTERNS OF CORPORATISTPOLCY-MAKING (Gerhard Lehmbruch &
Philippe C. Schmitter, eds., 1982).
20

See

Forest

Stewardship

Council

Statutes

<http://www.fscoax.org/principal.htm>. Membership was originally divided into
an economic chamber with 25% of the voting power and an environmental-social
chamber with 75%. The tri-partite arrangement was adopted in 1996, after
considerable criticism from industrial and commercial interests.
21
The subchambers are an effort to compensate for a low level of
representation from developing countries. As of September 1999, membership

stood as follows:
Economic Chamber:

124 members, 30 (24%) from the South.

Environmental Chamber: 137 members, 41 (43%) from the South.
Social Chamber:
52 members, 14 (27%) from the South.
See Thomber, Equity andCertification,supra note 18, at 34.

The low overall level of membership in the Social Chamber is also noteworthy.
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selects the members allowed to represent each type of interest in its
central governing body.22 The FSC has also begun to focus on
"national initiatives" "to decentralize the work of the FSC and to
encourage local participation."23 It might thus be seen as gradually
building a federalist structure.
The FSC's operational authority is vested in a nine member
Board of Directors, who are elected to staggered three-year terms by
the General Assembly. Two members of the Board are from the
economic chamber; the other seven are from the environmental and
social chambers.24 The Board is responsible for managing the
organization, dispersing its budget, provisionally admitting members,
and a host of other activities25 that, while nominally ministerial, play
a large role in shaping the policies of the organization. The daily
work of the FSC international office is carried out by a Secretariat of
approximately a dozen individuals headed by an executive director
and headquartered in Oaxca, Mexico. 26 Their 1998 budget was
approximately $1.2 million U.S.2

Applications can be accepted by the Board of Directors, but are subject
to challenge in the General Assembly. See FSC Statutes, Title Two, Secs. Seven
and Eight <http://www.fscoax.org/html/1-3.htm>.
23
FSC Protocol for Endorsing National Initiatives, FSC Doc. 4.1 (February
1998) <http://www.fscoax.org/html/4-1.html>.
24
See id.at Sec. Eighteen.
25
See id.
26
See Address List for FSC Directors and Secretariat, FSC Doc. 5.1.1.
(November 1999) <http://www.fscoax.org/html/5-1-1.html>. The FSC also has a
Technical Committee which reviews and makes recommendations to the Board on
matters such as the development of national and regional standards, an
Accreditation Committee, which reviews the applications of certification bodies
and proposes conditions of acceptance to the Board, a Dispute Resolution
Committee, and a growing group of regional representatives.
27
See Klas Sander, Transaction Costs and Forest Certification in Germany
(1999) (unpublished M.Sc. Thesis, Wye College, University of London).
Information on the total budgets of the national and regional programs was not
available at the time of this writing.
2
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B. Program Elements
1. Guiding Principles
The FSC program is oriented around ten overarching
principles.28 The Principles were developed and adopted early in
FSC's history, in 1994, when it was a relatively small organization
made up largely of environmentalists from Europe and North
America. The Principles are treated as self-evidently legitimate,
which is not entirely surprising, since they express gospel-like
verities that have emerged from a variety of processes in the
discussion on sustainable development.29 They
worldwide
28

FSC Principles and Criteria, supranote 6.

"Sustainable development" was most memorably defined by the
Brundtland Commission in 1987 as "development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own

29

needs." WORLD

COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR

COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987). In the worldwide dialogue on sustainable
development since then it has gradually come to be understood as having a
fundamental commitment to fusing the -often separated goals of environmental
protection, economic development, and-social equity. E.g., John Dernbach et al.,
US. Adherence to Its Agenda 21 Commitments: A Five-Year Review, ENVTL. L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,504, 10,507 (1999); J.B. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of
Relevance: Why Should Real-World EnvironmentalAttorneys Care Now about
SustainableDevelopment Policy?, 8 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 273 (1998).
Delegates to the Rio Conference in 1992, officially known as the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), adopted the
"Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global
Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development ofAll
Types of Forests," basically describing sustainable forest management as a good
idea which they would pursue. They also adopted "Agenda 21," in which the
governments agreed to cooperate with interest groups and other international
organizations in formulating "scientifically sound criteria and guidelines for the
management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests."
Agenda 21, Ch. 11, Sec. 11.22(b). For a thoughtful analysis of these documents and
their implications for international policy institutions, see Lee P. Breckenridge,
Protectionof Biological and CulturalDiversity: Emerging Recognition ofLocal
Community Rights in Ecosystems Under InternationalEnvironmental Law,59
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are also quite general, so that their meaning must be worked out in
more concrete processes of standard setting and certification. The
Principles are as follows (emphasis added):

1. Forest management shall respect all applicable
laws of the country in which they occur, and
international treaties and agreements to which the
country is a signatory, and comply with all FSC
Principles and Criteria.
2. Long-term tenure and use rights to the land and
forest resources shall be clearly defined, documented
and legally established.
3. The legal and customary rights of indigenous
peoples to own, use and manage their lands,
territories, and resources shall be recognized and
respected.
4. Forest management operations shall maintain or
enhance the long-term social and economic wellbeing of forest workers and local communities.
5. Forest management operations shall encourage the
efficient use of the forest's multiple products and
services to ensure economic viability and a wide
REv. 735 (1992).
The United Nations established a Commission for Sustainable
Development in 1993, "to review progress . . . in the implementation of
recommendations [by] ... the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED),... to elaborate policy guidance and options for future
activities to follow up UNCED and achieve sustainable development, [and] to
promote dialogue and build partnerships for sustainable development with
governments, the international community and the major groups identified in
Agenda 21 as key actors outside the central government who have a major role to
play in the transition towards sustainable development including women, youth,
indigenous peoples, non-governmental organizations, local authorities, workers and
trade unions, business and industry, the scientific community, and farmers."
<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csdback.htm>.
TENN. L.
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range of environmental and social benefits.
6. Forest management shall conserve biological
diversity and its associated values, water resources,
soils, and unique and fragile ecosystems and
landscapes, and, by so doing, maintain the ecological
functions and the integrity of the forest.
7. A management plan -- appropriate to the scale
and intensity of the operations -- shall be written,
implemented, and kept up to date. The long term
objectives of management, and the means of
achieving them, shall be clearly stated.
8. Monitoring shall be conducted -- appropriate to
the scale and intensity of forest management -- to
assess the condition of the forest, yields of forest
products, chain ofcustody, management activities and
their social and environmental impacts.
9. Management activities in high conservation value
forests shall maintain or enhance the attributes which
define such forests. Decisions regarding high
conservation value forests shall always be considered
in the context of a precautionary approach.3"

Principle 9 originally read as follows: "Primary forests, well-developed
secondary forests and sites of major environmental, social or cultural significance
shall be conserved. Such areas shall not be replaced by tree plantations or other
land uses." It was changed in early 1999 to allow for the possibility of logging in
those forests in appropriate cases. What kind of logging will be allowed in "high
conservation value forests" must now be worked out. The term is defined as
follows in the FSC glossary:
High ConservationValue Forestsare those that possess
one or more of the following attributes:
a) forest areas containing globally, regionally
or nationally significant:
30

concentrations of biodiversity values (e.g. endemism,
endangered species, refugia); and/or large landscape
level forests, contained within, or containing the
management unit, where viable populations of most if
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10. Plantations shall be planned and managed in
accordance with Principles and Criteria 1 - 9, and
Principle 10 and its Criteria. While plantations can
provide an array of social and economic benefits, and
can contribute to satisfying the world's needs for
forest products, they should complement the
management of, reduce pressures on, and promote the
restoration and conservation of natural forests.'

not all naturally occurring species exist in natural
patterns of distribution and abundance
b) forest areas that are in or contain rare,
threatened or endangered ecosystems
c) forest areas that provide basic services of
nature in critical situations (e.g. watershed protection,
erosion control)
d) forest areas fundamental to meeting basic
needs of local communities (e.g. subsistence, health)
and/or critical to local communities' traditional cultural
identity (areas of cultural, ecological, economic or
religious significance identified in cooperation with
such local communities).
FSC Principles and Criteria, FSC Doc. 1.2 <http://www.fscoax.org/html/1-2.html>.
31
The terms are defined as follows:
Natural Forest: Forest areas where many of the
principal characteristics and key elements of native
ecosystems such as complexity, structure and diversity
are present, as defined by FSC approved national and
regional standards of forest management.
Plantation:Forest areas lacking most of the principal
characteristics and key elements of native ecosystems
as defined by FSC-approved national and regional
standards of forest stewardship, which result from the
human activities of either planting, sowing or intensive
silvicultural treatments.
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These Principles are accompanied by "criteria" intended to
clarify their application. Thus, Principle 6, on conserving biological
diversity, is followed by ten criteria. An example is Criterion 6.2:

Safeguards shall exist which protect rare, threatened
and endangered species and their habitats (e.g.,
nesting and feeding areas). Conservation zones and
protection areas shall be established, appropriate to
the scale and intensity of forest management and the
uniqueness of the affected resources. Inappropriate
hunting, fishing, trapping and collecting shall be
controlled.3

While this criterion does flesh out the principle somewhat, it
still requires considerable interpretation. What are sufficient
safeguards to protect endangered species? What is an appropriate
conservation zone? What is inappropriate hunting? And so on.
Clearly, considerable judgment and policymaking will be involved in
applying these terms.
The Principles and Criteria are given further meaning in two
types of policy processes. The first, on which the FSC's literature
focuses, is the development of national and regional standards and
indicators. National standards are to be developed for smaller
countries with relatively homogenous forests, while regional
standards are for large countries with highly diverse forest situations,
such as the USA, Canada, and Mexico. Many regional and national
standard-setting processes are underway as this is written, and some
are discussed below.33 Few have been completed, however. The
second process of standard definition is the actual process of

32

2.html>.
33

FSC Principles and Criteria, FSC Doc. 1.2 <http://www.fscoax.org/html/1
See supra text accompanying notes 94 through 125.

-
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certification. An enormous amount of land has been certified in the
absence of governing national or regional standards and indicators,
meaning in practice that certifiers and applicants work out the
meaning of the Principles and Criteria on the ground.
2. Certification
a) of Forests
To be certified, forests must meet the FSC Principles and
Criteria and any applicable regional or national standards. Until
regional or national standards are approved, forests can be certified
based entirely on the Principles and Criteria. The certification is
conducted by an FSC accredited, third-party certifier. The certifier is
in charge of monitoring and re-accreditation as well. Costs of
certification are borne by the forest enterprise, although many
companies, particularly in developing countries, have received
financial assistance. The certification process is described further
4
below.1
b) of Certifiers
The FSC does not certify forests. Rather, it certifies certifiers,
who in turn certify forests and "chains of custody" for the products
that come from them." There are currently six FSC-approved
certification organizations, two in the United Kingdom, two in the
United States, and one each in the Netherlands and Switzerland.36 The
certifiers are essentially consulting firms, often with operations in
many countries. Most of them also are accredited to provide
certification under other systems, including the ISO. Four of the FSC

34
35
36

See supratext accompanying notes 61 through 93.
See Synnot, supranote 17, at xx.

See FSC Accredited Certification Bodies, FSC Doe. 5.3.1 (July 1999)

<http://www.fscoax.org/html/5-3- I.html>.
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accredited certifiers are for-profit organizations, and two are not-forprofit. Approximately ten applications from certifiers are pending
with the FSC as this article is published. All but one are European or
North American companies; the other is South African. 7
Although the FSC references certain general criteria, such as
compliance with the Principles and Criteria, "independence from
government or timber influence," and "sound evaluation
procedures,"38 its procedures for accrediting certifiers do not appear
transparent to the outside world. They seem to have varied with
individual cases, although the FSC now appears to be standardizing
the accreditation process.39 Certifiers are expected to maintain
"complete transparency and openness to scrutiny by the FSC," and
are subject to renewal review at least every five years.40

See FSC Applicant Certification Bodies, FSC Doc. 5.3.2 (November
1999) <http://www.fscoax.org/html/5-3-2.html>. One researcher estimates that it

37

costs a certifier approximately $13,000 to $16,OO0US to achieve certification, and

that it costs FSC International approximately the same amount to conduct the
certification review. See Sander, supra note 27. Personal interviews suggest that
these estimates may be too low.
39

CHRISTOPHER UPTON & STEPHEN BASS, THE FOREST CERTIFICATION

HANDBOOK 189 (1995).
39
FSC has produced a 200+ page manual on accreditation procedures, but
it still contains relatively little information on what the substantive standards for

accreditation are. See M.G. Wenban-Smith, et al., FSC Accreditation Manual, FSC
Doc. 3.1 (January 1998).
40

Id.
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3. Logo
Products produced from and traceable to certified forests are
entitled to carry the FSC logo, a somewhat deciduous looking conifer
which merges with a check mark and is bottomed on the letters
"FSC."

FSC
4. Chain of Custody
Because the system is driven in significant part by the FSC
logo on products, companies seeking to use it must achieve
certification of a "chain ofcustody" from primary production through
retail sale. Conceptually, this could require either that every wood
product be traceable to a particular forest, or that manufacturers of
certified products deal exclusively with certified producers or with
intermediate dealers who deal only with certified producers. For
large, diversified firms, particularly those buying and selling in
multiple markets, these requirements could be very onerous. On the
other hand, the legitimacy of the certification system depends on
consumer confidence that labeled products derive from forests
meeting FSC standards. Accordingly, the chain of custody
requirement has been a difficult and contentious issue for the FSC.
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At present it has come to rest on a policy that requires solid wood
products to come entirely from certified forests, but allows up to 30%
ofcomposite products, such as paper and chip products, to come from
non-certified lands.4 '
5. Demand and Supply Promotion
For the FSC certification system to work, consumers must
want and be able to find certified products. WWF and environmental
groups have taken a number of steps to build effective demand. First,
they have done a considerable amount of advertising, particularly in
media aimed at "cultural creatives," whom they believe can relatively
easily be persuaded to seek and buy certified products.42 Second,
they have promoted establishment of "buyers groups" composed of
wholesale and retail forest products dealers who commit themselves

See FSC Policy on Percentage-Based Claims, FSC Doc. 3.6.3, (Revised
February 24, 1999) <http://www.fscoax.org/principal.htm>. Paper and fiber
products may contain up to 75% recycled products and receive certification so long
as at least 70% of the remainder comes from FSC certified sources. For products
with lower recycled content there is a sliding scale. For example, a product with
50% recycled content must have at least 35% FSC endorsed virgin wood fiber, thus
allowing up to 15% non-certified fiber. Id.
42
Personal communications. One interviewee put the strategy very clearly:
What we're shooting for is what some people call the
"cultural creatives," . . . folks that are aware of the
ecological impacts of their purchasing, the ones that
look for the stamp of the dolphin friendly tuna on the
shelf. And it's a rather large portion of the country....
Something like 10 percent of the nation's population is
within the cultural creative category. And if we can
reach that 10 percent then this whole thing will really
take off. Even though we don't have to get out the rest of
41

society ....

I think the cultural creatives can pull a lot

of other folks along with them. And so that's the
strategy, is to launch an education campaign that's aimed
at the cultural creatives.
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to buying only certified products as of a certain date. 43 The first and
still the most significant is the U.K. "1995+ Group," which is said to
account for approximately 15% of the demand for wood products in
the U.K. at present, 44 and for over 25% of retail sales. 45 Buyers groups

have also been established in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
46
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Third, environmental groups have put pressure on major retailers to
carry FSC certified products, which in turn has put pressure on their
suppliers to produce them. 4 Environmental groups have occasionally
organized demonstrations outside retail outlets of companies they
believe are not moving quickly enough.48 Whether due to this
Some of these groups have specified FSC certification. But because of
trade law concerns, they are likely simply to specify certification to comparable
standards.
44
See <http:llwww.panda.org/forests4life/forestmaps/95stats.htm>.
45
See Elliott, Forest Certification, supra note 8, at 25.
46
See FSC Buyers Groups: Contact Details <http://www.fscoax.org/html/53-6.html>.
47
The UK building supply chain, B&Q, with 19% of that country's retail
building supply market, adopted a policy of commitment to sustainably produced
timber almost a decade ago, when some sectors of the environmental movement
momentarily undertook a tropical timber boycott. B&Q recently promised that "by
the end of 1999, B&Q will only purchase timber based products from forests
independently certified by a certifier accredited by the Forest Stewardship
Council." <http://www.b-and-q.co.uk/aboutus/environment/au-e timber.jsp>. In
1997 B&Q announced cancellation of a $1-2 million contract with MacMillan
Bloedel, the largest forest products company in British Columbia, due to a failure
of Macmillan Bloedel to demonstrate progress toward FSC certification. Six
months later, in a major turnabout, Macmillan Bloedel announced that its policy
was to meet the standards of all existing forest certification programs. See Elliott,
Forest Certification, supra note 8, at 432.
48
Home Depot, an American firm which is the world's largest wood retailer,
has also long advertised its efforts to sell sustainably produced timber, and recently
committed not to buy timber from endangered forests anywhere in the world.
<http://www.homedepot.com>. The company has been under continuing pressure
from the Rainforest Alliance to do better, however, and its stores have been
subjected to a number of demonstrations throughout North America over the past
43
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pressure or not, there are many anecdotal testimonials to their
influence and to business fears of bad publicity. Some of the best
evidence may be the growing number of firms that are scrambling to
address potential questions of certification by obtaining either FSC
or another form of certification.49 WWF has also worked to create
financing for production ofcertified timber in poor countries. In 1997
it announced a joint program with the World Bank to assist
developing countries to bring 200 million additional hectares under
certification by 2005.50 Regarding consumer demand at the retail
level, there is some indication of substantial demand for certified
products in Europe, and growing but more limited demand in North
America."' There is considerable uncertainty whether producers adopt
certification primarily to gain higher prices (a "green

year. The company's response is that there simply isn't enough certified wood
available to supply all of its operations. See Janet Wilson, Uneasy Partnerships
Form over EnvironmentalIssues, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1999 [hereinafter Wilson,
Uneasy Partnerships].
49
See, e.g., Dean Starkman,InternationalPaperHiresConsultantTo Assess
Forest-ManagementPractices,WALL ST. J., November 24, 1999, at A8 (reporting
on decisions by International Paper Company and a number of other forest
products companies to have their lands certified). IP chose to certify to the AF&PA
standard discussed below, but also to use an optional external auditor. The article
notes that more than 100 of IP's customers had inquired about its certification
status

so
On the supply side, WWF has also worked to create financing for
production of certified timber in poor countries. In 1997 it announced a joint
program with the World Bank to assist developing countries to bring 200 million
additional hectares under certification by 2005
<http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/wwf-wb4.htm>.
51
E.g., K. Forsyth, Certified Wood Products: The Potentialfor Price
Premiums,in LTS INTERNATIONAL REPORT (Scotland 1998); POTENTIAL MARKETS
FORCERTIFIED FOREST PRODUCTS INEUROPE, EU-project FAIR-CT95-766 Report
(Brita Pajari, et al., eds., 1998).
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premium"), to maintain or increase market share, or simply to avoid
bad publicity and resultant lower profits.52 It seems likely that all
three are true in different cases, and sometimes in the same ones.
6. Environmental Management Systems
To ensure implementation of its substantive standards, the
FSC requires the establishment of an "environmental management
system" (EMS) by the forest management organization. 3 The EMS
concept predates the FSC, and is in fact the primary element of the
ISO system discussed below. The fundamental idea of an EMS is that
the forest enterprise must have organizational arrangements for
setting environmental goals, gathering and analyzing information, and
planning, monitoring, and revising its plans. Such arrangements can
be quite elaborate in large organizations, and could be difficult for
small enterprises to implement. Because of the importance of
certifying small- and medium-sized firms, the FSC's EMS
requirements do not appear particularly demanding. Regional and
national standards typically require (1) a document stating
management objectives, detailing the forest resources involved and
their condition, and describing planning, implementation, and
monitoring procedures and (2) some implementation efforts, such as
communication of the general framework of the plan to employees.
These requirements are often reduced for small firms.54

52

See Hannah Scrase, CertificationofForestProductsforSmallBusinesses:

Improving Access - Issues and Options, Final Report to United Kingdom

Department for International Development (DFID), Renewable Natural Resources
Knowledge Strategy (RNRKS), Forestry Research Programme (FRP) pre-project
ZF0083, September 8,1999 <http://www.fsc-uk.demon.co.uk/DFIDREP3.rtf> (on
file with author); see also Pajari, supra note 51.
53
54

See UPTON & BASS, supra note 38. See also Synott, supranote 17.

See, e.g., the Maritime Regional Standards § 7.1.5.3
<http://www.web.net/fscca/standard.htm> (requiring landscape level plans for
enterprises larger than 500 hectares, but not for smaller ones); Swedish FSC
Standard for Forest Certification, Appendix 2 <http://www.fsc-
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7. Group Certification
Because economies of scale make certification more costly
per unit of production for small producers than for large ones,55 the
FSC allows the joint certification of groups of producers. 6 The
certificate is held by the group or by an individual responsible for the
group. Wood from complying members' lands is entitled to the full
benefits of certification. Groups can take many forms, including
preexisting ones formed for other purposes and new ones formed
especially for purposes ofcertification, possibly by an entrepreneurial
group manager. The FSC policy provides very general guidelines
about the allocation of responsibility between the group entity and its
members. The group entity is generally responsible for
communicating with the certifying entity and group members,
carrying out the administrative requirements of the certification, and
implementing group level management and monitoring
responsibilities. Members are generally responsible for conforming
to the requirements of certification and actually managing the land. 7
In light ofthe tremendous potential variability among groups and the
low level of experience with-group certification, the guidelines leave
substantial latitude to certifiers to define appropriate relationships and
control measures.5" Particular areas of concern include how to fairly
sample compliance by group members, what to do about individual
sweden.org/gron/stand.htm> [hereinafter Swedish FSC Standard] (distinction
between enterprises with less than 5,000 hectares of productive forest land and
those with more); Guidelines for Sustainable Forest Management, German FSC
Standards, 2ndDraft §7.2 <http://www.fsc-deutschland.de/> [hereinafter German
FSC Standards] (allowing enterprises of less than 150 hectares to submit
management reports based on expert assessment, rather than full scale management
plans).
55

E.g., Scrase, supra note 52, at 8; UPToN & BASS, supra note 38, at 106;

Elliott, Forest Certification, supra note 8, at 24.

See Group Certification: FSC Guidelines for Certification Bodies, FSC
Doc. 3.6.1 (July 31, 1998) <http://www.fscoax.org/html/groupp.html>.
56
57

58

See id.

See id.
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members who might not operate at the desired level of quality, and
how to assess the capacity for long-term management by a group. 9
Because group certification has the potential to develop new, nonstate-based, coordinative management mechanisms without
consolidating ownership, it deserves close study from both an
academic and a policy perspective.60
C. Program Operation
1. Certification Patterns
By the Fall of 1999, approximately 17 million hectares (42.5
million acres; 66,000 square miles) of forest had been certified in a
total of approximately 190 separate certificates granted by the six
approved certification organizations. 61 Approximately 80 percent of
the certified land is located in developed countries, and 20 percent is
in developing countries. 62 Two-thirds ofthe certified land is managed
by industrial enterprises, while less than five percent is held by
communities. 63 The proportion ofprivate to public land varies greatly
among regions.64

59

60

See id.

See generally, Ronald H. Coase, The Natureof the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA

386-405 (1937) and the literature following it, including William G. Ouchi,
Markets, Bureaucracies,and Clans, 25 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 129-41 (1980) and Oliver

E. Williamson, ComparativeEconomic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete
StructuralAlternatives,36 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 269-96 (1991).

See FSC List of Certified Forests, FSC Doc. 5.3.3 (October 31, 1999)
<http://www.fscoax.org/principal.htm>.
61

62

See Kirsti Thomber, Overview of Global Trends in FSC Certificates

(International Institute for Environment and Development ed., 1999) (on file with
author).
63
See id.at 3. The remainder of the land isheld by states (22%), joint (8%),
and small private (1%) enterprises. See id.
64

See id.
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2. The Certification Process
Although it plays a major role in defining and implementing
the FSC Principles, and although many millions of hectares of forest
have been certified, the certification process remains somewhat
shrouded in mystery. We do know a number of things about it,
however. A typical certification process takes from one to three
weeks' effort by a team of several people.6" Certifications may cost
anywhere from $500 to $130,000 US, though the lower figure is
unrealistic for any but the simplest situations. 6 Certifiers commonly
perform pre-certification checks to determine whether potential
applicants are "in the ball park" for certification, and often suggest
what actions would be needed to attain certification.67 Some certifiers
provide potential applicants with simple checklists so that they can
make ball park determinations on their own.6" If a certification
process is undertaken, it is likely to begin with a scoping visit, in
which a project team is put together and a work plan developed. 69 A
6S

See Kate Heaton & Richard Z. Donovan, Forest Assessment, in

CERTIFICATION OF FOREST PRODUCTS: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES

62 (Virgilio M.

Viana, et al. eds., 1996).

See UPTON & BASS, supra note 38, at 105. The cost of certifying a
community forest management project in Bolivia was estimated at $47,525. See
6

Matthew Markopoulos, The Impacts of Certification on Community Forest
Enterprises:A CaseStudy ofthe Lomerio Community ForestManagementProject,
Bolivia, Report to the Int'l Inst. for Env't. and Dev., Forest and Land Use Series

No. 13, Apr. 1998 [hereinafter Markopoulos, Bolivia]. These numbers do not
reflect the potential costs of changing management practices to achieve and
maintain certification. There remains a great deal of uncertainty about the actual
costs of certification, and this is apparently an additional impediment to wider use
of certification. See Scrase, supranote 52.
67
See UPTON& BASS, supranote 38, at 66. Pre-certification assessments can
also evidently be important to forestry firms seeking external financing, and
certifiers apparently allow them to be used for that purpose. Id. See also, UK FSC,
Certification
Step by Step <http://www.fscuk.demon.co.uk/localauthorities.html#StepbyStep>.
68

69

Personal communication.
See UPTON & BASS, supranote 38, at 84.
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typical team includes experts in at least forestry, ecology, and social
science' -- some of them local.7' The work plan is likely to involve
both a document review and a field assessment.' The field
assessment will involve checks of resource management operations
and interviews with external stakeholders.73 Both aspects require
sampling, since it is not possible to examine every hectare or
interview every interested party.74 A field visit takes at least several
person days and usually more, depending on the size ofthe operation.
The field visit typically concludes with a presentation of
preliminary findings by certifiers to the applicant and a discussion of
their validity.75 The results of the certification process are then
subjected to a peer review "to attest to the technical credibility of the
assessment methodology of a particular certification exercise and to
examine the conclusions reached by the assessment team. 7 6
Reviewers are chosen by the certification organization,77 subject
primarily to the criterion of professionalism. Certifiers apply different
methods to deciding whether to grant a certificate. Some use
numerical systems," others make overall qualitative judgments.79 In
either case, however, a great deal of discretion is involved, since
numbers are simply ways of organizing professional judgments in the
first place.
When certifications are granted, they generally specify
conditions requiring improvement."0 These can take the form of
"preconditions," which must be met before the certification becomes

72

See Heaton & Donovan, supra note 65, at 62.
See id.See also, Maritime Process, supra note 14.
See Heaton & Donovan, supra note 65.

73
74
75

See id.
See id.
See id.

76

UPTON & BASS, supranote 38, at 97.

77

See id.
See Heaton & Donovan, supranote 65, at 66.

70
71

78

79
80

Personal communication.
See Heaton & Donovan, supranote 65, at 66.
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effective, or "corrective actions" specifying improvements that are to
be made within a set time after the certification."' Certifiers are
expected to monitor compliance, but seem to have considerable
82
discretion in how to do so.
Conceptually, certification is an inherently complex process.
It involves checking and assessing potentially hundreds of standards
and indicators 3 over large areas and in highly variable environmental
and social conditions. No applicant is expected to fully meet every
standard and criterion. Certifiers therefore must make judgments
about whether, overall, an operation is "well managed" enough to
meet the Principles and Criteria and any local standards. In doing so
they must give concrete meaning to the Principles, Criteria, and
standards, and then make an overall balance to decide how much
compliance is enough. At present, how that is done is very poorly
understood outside professional certifier circles.
Our limited understanding of the on-the-ground certification
process significantly constricts our understanding of the role of the
certification process in sustainable development policy. While there
are some good reasons for the opaque character of certification
(including confidentially concerns, 8' the technical complexity of the

81

See Elliott, Forest Certification, supranote 8, at 21.

Compared to the AF&PA Sustainable Forestry Initiative discussed in
Section III, the FSC system leaves a large amount of discretion in the hands of the
certifier. The AF&PA gives much more control over these issues to the forest

82

management organization.

The Canadian Maritime Regional Standard, for example, contains over
150 individual standards and almost 250 additional indicators. See Maritime
Regional Standard, supra note 54. Some standards are somewhat shorter, and
contain shorter lists of indicators, but it seems unlikely that certification under them
will be significantly simpler.
84
Many forestry firms will understandably be hesitant to risk disclosure of
proprietary information on their forest stocks and management practices, and may
avoid certification if such disclosures result.
83
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decision process, 5 the costs of transparency,86 and the risks of unfair
criticism of certification decisions87), opacity also creates some
significant problems. We know from research on other compliance
and enforcement processes that a great deal of discretion is present in
decisions on particular cases, and that how it is used varies
considerably."
Because the exercise of case-level discretion is an important
part of any policy process, scholars generally agree that it should be
subject to some form of discipline, whether through rules governing
its application, 9 supervisory oversight,9" or extensive information
disclosure.9 The FSC system relies on the professionalism of
certifiers and the possibility of FSC oversight to discipline the
system. However, these may be weak reeds on which to hang the
system's legitimacy. First, certifier professionalism, while valuable
and crucial, is exercised in a market context where certifiers need to
satisfy current clients and gain new ones. Thus they may feel
Policy decisions are intertwined with many gritty factual details and
technical issues, and are not easy to disentangle from them.
86
Certifiers argue that it is already quite expensive simply to perform
certification reviews, and that subjecting them to additional documentation and
research would inappropriately raise the costs to the party seeking certification.
Personal communications.
87
The inherent discretion in the decision process combined with the need to
balance multiple considerations means that it will often be easy to cast certification
decisions in a bad light. Unfair or manipulative criticisms would not seem unlikely,
given the competing interests ofnon-certified firms and other certification systems.
85

88

E.g.,

KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: THE SOCIAL

DEFINITION OF

POLLUTION

(1984);

MICHAEL

LIPSKY,

STREET-LEVEL

BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980).
89
E.g., KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969) (asserting that

the organization holding the discretion should make rules for its exercise);
THEODORE LOwI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969) (proposing that the legislature
should make clear rules for the exercise of discretion).
90
E.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Reforming Public Bureaucracy through
Economic Incentives, 2 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 131 (1986).
91
E.g., Eric W. Orts, ReflexiveEnvironmentalLaw,89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227-

1312 (1995).
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complex incentives to "be reasonable" and possibly to develop market
niches involving distinct, albeit subtle, reputational differences.92
Second, the FSC's administrative resources, as noted above, are quite
limited, and it does not appear to have the capacity to conduct
extensive certification reviews.93 Third, the private control of
certification information inhibits the dialogue among certifiers and
the public that is likely to be essential both to achieving consistency
among certifiers and to developing publicly legitimate definitions of
appropriate forest practices. In the future, therefore, it seems likely
that an increased level of external review, possibly including
systematic academic research, will be necessary to illuminate and
legitimate the FSC certification process.

92

Similar problems affect public permitting processes, such as the US

Environmental Protection Agency's implementation of the Clean Water Act:
Congress wanted technology-based standards to apply

uniformly to similar sources across the nation, but the
permits were negotiated on an individualized basis
incorporating whichever control measures and
compliance schedules dischargers would accept. EPA

characterized these permits as grounded on "best
professionaljudgment;" but they often reflected simply

the "best deal" the Agency could obtain in light of
manpower and time constraints and its desire to
demonstrate progress. These "best professional
judgments" were usually made by EPA regional

personnel with water quality, not technology-based
orientations.
Howard Latin, RegulatoryFailure,Administrative Incentives, andthe New Clean
Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1672 (1991).
93
Again, the EPA's ability to effectively review state permitting decisions,

despite its enormity relative to the FSC, has been quite limited. E.g., Victor B.
Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failureof Enforcement in the Clean
Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1 (1997); John P. Dwyer, The Practice
ofFederalism Under the CleanAir Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995).
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3. Regional and National Standard Setting
The FSC system is designed to facilitate place-based public
dialogue in the regional and national standard setting processes.
These processes are to adapt the Principles and Criteria to regional
conditions and to provide concrete guidelines for certifiers. Work on
standards is currently underway in a number of standard setting
groups; approved standards have been completed by a few. The
groups vary considerably in composition and organization. Many,
such as the British,94 Danish,95 German,96 and Swedish 97 ones, mimic
the tripartite environmental-economic-social structure of the
international FSC. Some add another sector or two, such as the
Cameroonian effort, which also has government and research
sectors. 98 Some, such as the first British Columbia standard writing
process, evidently have narrower bases.99 Still others, such as the
Canadian Maritime Region, which involved nine categories of
interests, are built to reflect more complex local stakeholder
structures)0 0 Drafting can be done either by committee members or
by consultants. Several of the earlier processes, such as the British
and Swedish ones, used consultants to draft standards and then

94

See Status of National and Regional Certification Initiatives, FSC Doc.

4.3.3., at 20 (March 1999) [hereinafter "FSC Status Report"]
<http://www.fscoax.org/html/4-3-3.htm>.
95
See id. at 9.
96
See German FSC Website <http://www.fsc-deutschland.de/fscag.gif>.
97
See FSC Status Report, supra note 94, at 19.
98
See id. at 6.
99
According to Hoberg, the British Columbia regional standard writing
committee was composed of a "close-knit group of environmentalists with no
involvement from major BC forest companies." Its draft standards are to be redone
by a more broadly based group. See George Hoberg, The Coming Revolution in
Regulatingour Forests,20 POLICY OPTIONS 53, 54 (December 1999).
100
See Maritime Process, supranote 14. The Maritime Process also suffered
from very limited participation by industrial forestry interests. See subsection (a)
infra.
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committees to review and revise them.' Later ones, such as the
Maritime and evidently most of the North American efforts, seem to
rely primarily on committee members.
Because it was one of the earliest and best documented
standard setting processes, and because it worked with a complex
stakeholder structure, the Canadian Maritime process is described
below to give a flavor for the regional standard setting process. Other
processes are compared to give a sense of variation.
a) The Canadian Maritime Process
The Canadian Maritime Region, for FSC standard-setting
purposes, covers the provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and
Prince Edward Island. The Canadian FSC purposely sought to build
a standard writing committee representing stakeholder groups in the
region. The Technical Standards Writing Committee ("Writing
Committee"), which did most of the standard development, had
eighteen members representing nine self-defined categories: First
Nations, large industry, small industry, professionals-academics,
environmentalists, community groups, youth, woodlot owners, and
government." 2 The Writing Committee members were selected by
people who classified themselves as members of the groups the
Committee members were to represent, and who attended a large
public meeting to inaugurate the regional standard writing process.
The Writing Committee met approximately monthly (sometimes for
several days at a time) over the course of two years to develop a draft
set of standards and then to redraft them. The effort was supported by
small grants from foundations and a great deal of donated time.
Provincial forestry authorities were invited to participate in the
process but declined to do so. They did, however, make two
individuals available to the Writing Committee as "technical advisory
support." Most of the standard writing occurred indoors, but the
101
102

See Maritime Process, supra note 14.
See id.
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Committee did hold a "mock certification" in several woodlots a little
over half way through the drafting process, and expressed the view
that this was a very good thing that probably should have been done
03
earlier.1
The Writing Committee's meetings were closed to the public,
and its deliberations were subject to a confidentiality agreement.'0 4
Although the Committee established rules for voting, it never actually
voted. Instead, it sought to achieve consensus, often through extended
meetings and dialogues.'0 5

We decided early on that issues would be
discussed until all views were on the table, and then,
if consensus seemed highly unlikely, we would move
on to another point. In this way we worked through all
the common ground, and we found we had much
more in common than we thought. At each meeting
we returned to the difficult points and, miraculously,
they began to disappear. By the end of March, 1998,
two years after beginning the process, there were only
three points on which we could not reach consensus:
biocide use, introduction of exotic tree species, and
the amount of protected area that was required to be
set aside by large industrial owner/managers. 06

103

104

105

See id.
See id.
See id.

106
Id. This document is presented as the collective memory of the group.
Authorship isnot attributed.
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A sense of how the areas of disagreement were worked out
can be gleaned from the progress of the biocide rule. The spring 1998
draft was structured as follows:

6.6 Management systems shall promote the
development and adoption of environmentally
friendly non-chemical methods of pest management
and strive to avoid the use of chemical pesticides.
World Health Organization Type A and B and
chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides; pesticides that are
persistent, toxic or whose derivatives remain
biologically active and accumulate in the food chain
beyond their intended use; as well as any pesticides
banned by international agreement, shall be
prohibited. If chemicals are used, proper equipment
and training shall be provided to minimize health and
environmental risks.
6.6.1 An owner/manager must adopt management
systems that are designed with the intention of
eliminating dependence on and use of biocides.
6.6.2 The use of biocides or synthetic chemical
fertilizers must be considered negative from an
ecological perspective.
6.6.3 (Track 1) The use of biocides or synthetic
chemical fertilizers is prohibited, except in
circumstances where there is a clear scientific
justification based upon ecological risk/benefit
analysis for each specific situation.
6.6.3 (Track 2) The use of biocides and synthetic
chemical fertilizers is prohibited, except in rare
circumstances in which it can be shown that the use of
these substances will benefit ecosystem health.
6.6.3 (Track 3) Use of biocides or synthetic chemical
fertilizers is prohibited.
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The version adopted reads as follows:

6.6.1 * The use of biocides and synthetic chemical
fertilizers are [sic] prohibited, except in the very rare
cases where an exotic invader threatens the existence
of indigenous plant or animal populations and when
there is no alternative method available. 7

Similar compromises, quite environmentally protective on the
whole, were made in resolving controversies over exotic species and
bio-diversity protection on large private landholdings. The
traditionally divisive issue of clear-cutting ("even-aged
management") was resolved by reference to the overall goal of
restoring what was understood to the natural forest of the region.
Since that forest contained large amounts of fire dependent species
such as jack pine, clear cutting is allowed when it serves as a
surrogate for fire. Clear-cut opening sizes are limited to 5 hectares
and must have irregular perimeters. Clumps of live trees and
abundant standing and downed coarse woody debris must also be left
on site. How the biocides and clear-cutting rules will fare with the
timber industry is uncertain at best. Heavy industry complained
frequently about being under-represented in the process, and seems
often to have chosen not to participate even when it could have.0 8

Id. The single asterisk (*) after the section number indicates that failure
to meet this standard would be a "major problem" for certification. "Ifthe applicant
for certification fails at this level, conditions must require remediation within a
reasonable time inorder for the applicant to maintain certified status. Two asterisks
would indicate a 'fatal flaw.' If the applicant for certification fails at this level, the
audit report must contain 'preconditions' requiring remediation which will result
in a passing mark before certification can be granted." Id.
108
It is also interesting to note that at least one certifier employed as a
consultant to the process counseled the writing committee against setting such strict
criteria for clear-cutting and biocide use. He suggested leaving the issues to
107
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The Writing Committee's official history suggests that
members experienced a certain amount of deliberative learning0 9 in
the process:

It is interesting that individuals from interest groups
directly represented (in some cases from the same
organization) on the committee sometimes disagreed
with things that received approval from their
colleagues. This is a strong indication ofthe power of
this sort of wide-open consensus process. Those that
participated actually evolved in their understanding
through the process, whereas those from the same
groups, or organizations who did not participate
maintained their original viewpoints."0

Those "disagreeing outsiders" may have their say over time,
since the regional FSC envisions a dynamic process of continuous
feedback with revisions in the standard to occur every two years, and
since the Maritime Region FSC Standards are still subject to an
internal challenge."'

"certifier discretion." Id.
109
See generally Ortwin Renn & Katharina Zoeller, The Challenge of
Interpreting Deliberation and Expertise: A Model Procedurefor Integrating

Knowledge and Values (paper presented to the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, 1998) (on file with the author).
110
See Maritime Process, supranote 14. "Sometimes we came to agree that
the best solution on a particular point was not the one favoured by all the
organizations we represented; this caused some of us grief "at home" where our
friends/colleagues/bosses did not have the benefit of soaking in all the views
around the table." Id, entry for June 25, 1998.
II
Personal communication. There is also some evidence that the Canadian
Forest Industry may have decided to become much more involved in regional
standard setting processes. See Hoberg, supra note 99.
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After the Writing Committee had completed a second, nearfinal draft in the spring of 1998, a Regional Steering Committee
("Steering Committee") to guide the next phases of the effort was
selected by acclamation at a large public meeting. The nineteen
members were organized in four "houses" -- First Nations, Economic,
Environmental, and Social, but were sometimes also listed as a more
diversified group similar to the Writing Committee. Indeed some of
the Steering Committee members had also been Writing Committee
members. The Steering Committee contained more landowners
actually involved in forestry - mostly small "woodlot owners.""12
After the second draft had become the third and semi-final
draft, the Steering Committee sought to "harmonize" it with draft
standards in other regions and countries with comparable forests. A
consultant prepared a harmonization report,"' and the Steering
Committee then decided whether and how to conform the Maritime
standard to standards from other regions. After the harmonization
process, the standard went to FSC International for possible approval.
The standard was reviewed and returned to the Steering Committee
with the indication that it would be approved after the Steering
Committee responded to comments regarding the conversion of
hardwoods to pine forests, low value-added, and biocide use.I 4 It was
eventually approved, but after intense discussions about improving
the "balance" of the standard writing group and the substance of the
biocide provision in particular."' As of this writing a new regional

See Maritime Process, supra note 14.
Karen Tam, Comparison of Maritime Region Draft Standards with Great
Lakes-St.Lawrence Region Draft Standards and North-East Region (U.S.) Draft
112
113

Standards,

Appendix

C

--

Harmonization

Reports

(July

1998)

<http://www.canadian-forests.com/fsc-process.html>.
114
Regional and headquarters FSC officers had not responded to queries
about the content of those comments as this article went to press.
,,s
See Olaf Johansson, FSC Board of Directors Chair & Timothy Synott,
FSC Executive Director, Statement on the FSC Endorsement of the Maritime
Regional Standards, <http://wwws.fscus.org/news/maritimestatement.html>.
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committee is being constituted, presumably with greater
representation of industrial forest interests. The biocide provision is
expected to be reworked "interpreting the FSC Principles and Criteria
116
in a broader sense.
The general contours of the Maritime standard writing process
resemble what American administrative lawyers would call a
negotiated rulemaking process (a "reg-neg"), 7 with two important
exceptions. First, the stakeholder participants have greater control
over the content of the standard than would a reg-neg group. While
FSC International reviews standards and requires changes prior to
adoption, it does not have the option of writing an entirely different
site-specific standard as would an agency in the reg-neg process." 8
Second, the meetings of the Maritime standard writing group were
closed, whereas reg-neg meetings must be publicly announced and
open under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 9 The decision to
keep the Maritime standard writing meetings closed was
controversial. The group acknowledged that the policy was in tension
with the ideal of transparency, but largely defended it as necessary to
120
making progress in a politically charged environment.
b) General Issues
The role of stakeholders in standard development is likely to
remain a point of contention. There are two dimensions to the
question. The most obvious problem is which stakeholders should be
directly represented in the standard writing process. As suggested
above, the environmental/social/economic framework is vaguely
suggestive, but provides no clear guidance. The biggest question for
Id.
See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§561-570a; see generally,
Jody Freeman, CollaborativeGovernance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
116
117

L. Rev. 1 (1997).

118
119

120

See USA Group Loan Services, Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 1996)
Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. Appx prec §§ 1-15.
See Maritime Process, supranote 14.
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a program with origins in the environmental movement is how much
industry involvement is appropriate. In the early going there seems to
have been a relatively low level of industry involvement in many
standard setting processes, particularly in North America. In many
cases, this may have been by mutual consent. As this article goes to
press, however, there seems to be a rethinking on both sides, with
both the FSC and industry seeking greater industry involvement.' 2 '
A second problem is how standard writing bodies should
relate to stakeholders who have been defined as external. A number
of FSC standard setting bodies have experienced conflicts regarding
the appropriate role of national and international environmental and
other interest groups. Some participants, perhaps more influenced by
professional foresters and technical experts, have sought to confine
standard setting processes to knowledgeable regional stakeholders
working around a table together. Others, perhaps more influenced by
traditional environmental activists, have sought to bring transregional constituencies to bear on regional standard setting processes
through the use of direct lobbying, letter writing campaigns, threats
of negative publicity, and the like.'
A widely cited difficulty is how "high" to set standards. One
interviewee describes the issue clearly:
The problem that we're coming up against is that the
[regional standard setting] groups are setting the bar
for developing standards at different heights.... In
some cases the groups are setting the bar so that they
"certify the best," which is, you know, setting the bar
pretty high. And in other cases the groups are setting
the bar at a lower level so they can "certify the rest,"
bring them on board, and then incrementally step up
123
the bar as they have buy-ins from landowners.

121
122
123

See Hoberg, supra note 99; personal communications.
Personal communications.
Personal communications.
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The primary FSC solution to this problem is the
"harmonization" process described above. This is an important
process, but it will frequently require preferring one regional standard
setting group over another. It thus faces the possibility of creating
significant discontent among participants in processes whose
standards will need to be modified.'24 The problem is exacerbated by
the possibility ofcertifying public land, which some people from both
industry and environmental groups argue should be held to a higher
standard than private land.'25
D. Implications for Environment, Community, and Human
Rights
The implications of the FSC certification system for
environment, human rights, and community remain an open question,
since experience with the system is brief. Some tentative conclusions
can be suggested, however.

124

As one participant put it:
FSC is looking into ... how they can harmonize... without

giving the impression that this is a top down approach coming
out of FSC. So it's a real kind of ajuggling act that's going on
right now between the regions and the national headquarters.
Personal communication.
125
The Sierra Club recently raised the stakes by taking the position that there
should be "zero cut" from the federal lands, including those managed by the Forest
Service and the Bureau of Land Management. See Sierra Club Website,
<http://www.sierraclub.org/forests/>. Other environmentalists fear that, in addition
to precluding any form of traditional certification, this has the potential to split the
environmental movement between those who back the zero cut option and those
who would be happy with greatly improved practices on federal lands, even if they
involve some logging. Personal communications.
No federal lands have received FSC certification to date, and the Forest
Service is on record with the position that it does not intend to seek third party
certification for any of its lands. See Memorandum from Acting Deputy Chief
Janice McDougle (May 8, 1997). See also FSC U.S. Website,
<http://www.fscus.org/currentissues/federallands.html>.
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1. Environment
The Maritime region's primary focus on traditional
"environmental" issues -- biocides, clear cutting, exotic species, and
biodiversity protection -- also seems to characterize the FSC system
generally. The Principles and Criteria, and the standards they have
spawned, are highly environmentally protective on the whole. Were
they to be universally applied, the condition of the world's forests
would improve greatly. The standards are voluntary, however, and
their actual effects are contingent on how widely they are adopted and
followed. At this time, the amount of FSC certified forest, while
substantial in its own right, is miniscule relative to the world forest
environment -- approximately 0.5 percent.' 26
Most of the enterprises that have sought or received
certification to date appear to have started with relatively high
management standards. Thus the marginal environmental
improvement resulting from certification on those lands has not been
great.'2 7 On the other hand, it is possible that certified products will
command higher prices than non-certified products over time, or that
certification will become increasingly necessary to retain market
share (although knowledgeable observers disagree about both
prognostications). 2 ' To the degree that either or both of these
conditions apply, some substandard producers may be prompted to
raise their management standards to obtain higher prices or retain
market share. Nonetheless, the certified market in the near to medium
terms seems likely to remain small. For example, one analyst puts it
at no more than 25% of the European market by 2005, and
This calculation assumes a total global forest area 3,454 million hectares,
as reported in Rachel Crossley & Jonathan Points, Investing in Tomorrow's
Forests, Report to the World-Wide Fund for Nature, 1998, at 27
<http://vww.panda.org/forests4life/ffl_pub.htm>. Their figure is derived from
126

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
WORLD's FOREsTs (1997).
127
See Thornber, Equity and Certification,supranote 18.
128

See supra discussion accompanying notes 42-52.
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significantly less elsewhere." 9 Certification also has no impact on
practices such as "timber mining" and conversion of timberland to
other uses (such as ranching), which pose the greatest immediate
threats to forest ecosystems. 30 Finally, the FSC system also has
difficulty dealing with landscape level problems. Since it certifies
individual producers in more or less the same way that a regulatory
agency handles individual "cases," coordinating management among
different producers, which perhaps should pursue different goals to
maximize overall environmental conditions, will be difficult. The
primary hope here is that the FSC certification system will create
sufficient cross-ownership dialogue to promote increased joint goal
setting and coordination.' However, the degree to which this will
actually occur is highly speculative at present and will require
considerable future research to ascertain.
In sum, the environmental effects of the FSC as a free
standing voluntary system are likely to be positive but modest. Two
additional types of dynamics, however, have the capacity to amplify
the effects of the FSC program. The first is incorporation into
traditional legal systems. Although this could occur through the
formal adoption of FSC standards or requirements by either
legislatures or administrative agencies, not many legal systems seem
likely to take this route in the near term. However, incorporation can
also occur through the informal, often almost invisible adoption of
FSC requirements into existing legal regimes. These include the
definition of best management practices in administrative regulation,

129

See Ewald Rametsteiner, Policy Analysis of Certification of Forest

ManagementasaPolicyInstrumentto PromoteMulti/imnctionalSustainableForest
Management6, Report to the European Forest Institute, May 1999.
130
This is not to assume that all conversions are undesirable. There are

undoubtedly some conversions to farm land that most observers would find
acceptable and perhaps desirable. See Thornber, Equity and Certification,supra
note 18, at 6.

See, e.g., Elliott, Forest Certification, supra note 8, at 458; Errol
Meidinger, Laws and Institutions in Cross-BoundaryStewardship, in Richard L.
Knight & Peter B. Landres, STEWARDSHIP ACROSS BOUNDARIES (1998).
13
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tort law, financial reporting, and so on. Although the process of
informal incorporation cannot be analyzed or described in any detail
in this article, it does seem likely to move forward in the near term,
thereby expanding the effects of the FSC program beyond what is
apparent in its own terms. 32
A second potential means of amplification is through the
operation of other non-governmental forestry programs. It seems
clear that some other forest certification programs have been spurred
into existence by the FSC initiative. Although they may have been
partially intended to fend off what were seen as overly stringent
standards, the other programs are still caught in a dynamic that
pressures them to make their systems credible, and that dynamic has
33
led to more serious standards and verification systems over time.
Thus it seems likely that the FSC program will lead to improvements
in environmental management beyond the domain of firms actually
certified in the FSC system. The magnitude and durability of those
changes, of course, remains to be seen, and it is possible that the
proliferation of programs will ultimately undermine the possibility of
a single strong one emerging.
2. Human Rights
Most human rights issues fall under the rubric of social
concerns in the FSC system. The FSC's effort to advance social
concerns in both its organizational structure and its Principles reflects
its origins in a world-wide dialogue on "sustainable development," a
dialogue which pursues the mutual accommodation and integration

132

For an analysis of this process in the North American context, see Errol

Meidinger, IncorporatingEnvironmental Certification Systems in Traditional
Legal Systems: the American Case (paper prepared for the Conference on The

Integration of Voluntary Approaches into Existing Legal Systems, Brussels, Feb.
24 - 25, 2000) <http://www.ublaw.buffalo.edu/fas/meidinger/certlaw.pdf>
[hereinafter Meidinger, IncorporatingCertificationSystems].
13

See the discussion of the changes in the AF&PA program in Section IV.
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of economic, environmental, and equity (social) goals.'3 4 Many FSC
social concerns include both human rights and community issues.
These issues are often intertwined, of course, and are somewhat
arbitrarily divided between this section and the next. The FSC
program is also related to a long line of voluntary codes and
certification programs seeking to promote human rights, which
cannot be canvassed in this article. 35 FSC human rights concerns are
of two general types: (1) natural resource control and access and (2)
worker safety and employment.
a) Natural Resource Control
FSC Principles 2 and 3 are emphatic in protecting long term
tenure and use rights, as well as legal and customary rights of
36
indigenous peoples: 1

2. Long-term tenure and use rights to the land and
forest resources shall be clearly defined, documented
and legally established.
3. The legal and customary rights of indigenous
See infra note 29. For a comprehensive discussion, see Elliot, Forest
Certification, supra note 8, at 94-155.
135
See generally Janelle Diller, A Social Conscience in the Global
134

Marketplace? Labour Dimensions of Codes of Conduct, Social Labelling and
Investor Initiatives, 138 INT. LAB. REV. 99-129 (1999) (surveying 215 voluntary

codes and 12 social labeling programs); Douglass Cassel, CorporateInitiatives:A
SecondHuman Rights Revolution? 19 FORDHAM INT'LL.J. 1963-84 (1996); Robert
J. Liubicic, CorporateCodes ofConductandProductLabelingSchemes:the Limits
and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private
Initiatives,30 L. & POL. ININT'L. BUS. 111-58 (1998).
136

See supratextaccompanying notes 28-31. These provisions are consistent

with a series of international legal instruments that have been drafted and adopted
in recent years to protect indigenous peoples and their relationships to land. For a
current survey, see Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Peoples,YRBK. INT'L ENVTL.
L. (forthcoming 1999) (on file with author).

1999-2000] PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 169
peoples to own, use and manage their lands,
territories, and resources shall be recognized and
13 7
respected.
3
Most national and regional standards are similarly protective.'
Principle 2 sounds fairly noncontroversial, but can confront
significant difficulties in practice. The main problem is that long-term
tenure and use rights are subject to significant doubt in many forested
areas. In the Brazilian Amazon, for example, long-term ownership
rights are often granted to individual land holders, but are conditional
on the land being put to beneficial use. Some scholars have argued
that the beneficial use requirement in fact encourages deforestation,
both by giving squatters an ostensible justification for clearing land
whose title is held by others, and by thus encouraging title holders to
preemptively clear land to demonstrate beneficial use.'39 While the
accuracy of this analysis is subject to vigorous dispute, 4 ' it illustrates
the tensions that can arise between property rights protection and
equity concerns.
A second problem occurs when the property rights of the
forest management entity are of relatively short duration, perhaps in
renewable terms, as is the case with many community forestry
operations in developing countries. In these cases the capacity of the
forestry operation to promise long-term sustainable management can
be in serious doubt, since their ability to manage the resources could
disappear entirely with a change in political administrations or other
conditions.

137

FSC Principles and Criteria, supra note.6.

138
139

See, e.g., Maritime Regional Standards, supra note 54, §§ 2.2 & 3.2.
See Lee J. Alston et al., Land Reform Policies, the Sources of Violent

Conflict, and Implicationsfor Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, J. ENV'T

ECON. & MGMT. (forthcoming) (on file with author).
140
E.g., Emilio F. Moran, The Law, Politics,and Economics ofAmazonian
Deforestation, 1 INDEP. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397 (1994).
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Principle 3, protecting legal and customary rights of
indigenous peoples, also faces both practical and conceptual
problems. At the conceptual level, Principle 3 is in considerable
tension both with itself and with Principle 2 in many parts of the
world. This is because many state legal systems have been used to
officially dispossess indigenous peoples from their traditional lands
and customs. Thus "legal" title can be in serious tension with
customary rights. The doors to recognizing customary rights in state
legal systems are not all closed. Indeed, subjected to strong
arguments and continuous pressures, some state legal systems have
shown a remarkable willingness to reconsider traditional land claims
that most citizens probably assumed had been extinguished. 4 '
Nonetheless, state land claims adjudications tend to be astonishingly
slow, often operating in terms of decades and even half-centuries, and
not the kind of thing that can be casually
quite expensive"142
included in the course of a certification process.
Moreover, Principle 3's coverage is subject to some
ambiguity. What is the reach of the term "their... resources?" Does
the term cover plants that indigenous people traditionally harvested,
but that are located on land now belonging to someone else? One
could argue either way based on the Principle, and it seems likely that
its practical reach will be defined in regional standard setting and in
43
certification processes. 1
At the practical level, it is not clear how aware certifiers will
be of customary claims, given that they are often unrecorded and that
landowners may have little incentive to raise them. Even when
certifiers are aware of claims, they may find it very difficult to make
E.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
Id.
143
There is also a significant problem with subsurface resources, which in
many countries are retained by the government, no matter who owns the surface.
The right to exploit these can effectively destroy the forest based rights of
141

142

indigenous peoples. See S. James Anaya, Environmentalism,Human Rights and
Indigenous Peoples: A Tale of Converging and DivergingInterests,infra p.1 this

volume.
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determinations on their existence and scope. The Canadian
Maritime 144 and German 145 standards deal with this possibility by

mandating "appropriate" dispute settlement mechanisms, but without
defining what they might be. The Swedish standard is more specific.
It refers to a government-defined reindeer husbandry area for the
Sami people, and it mandates both that legal requirements for
reindeer husbandry be met, and that forest managers plan their
operations to preserve access to arboreal lichens and areas of special
importance to reindeer. 46
In addressing disputed customary claims, FSC dispute
settlement processes will have to decide how to relate to existing
governmental processes for defining property and use rights. The
FSC processes could either operate independently or invoke
governmental decision mechanisms. It may be attractive to certifiers
to use governmental mechanisms since they have established
procedures and may offer more finality and legal defensibility to
decisions. When certifiers create separate dispute resolution
processes, however, it is possible that they might play a role in
establishing more expansive definitions ofcustomary and indigenous
rights than formal legal systems would. 47 It will be important to
observe whether any such expansion occurs.
b) Worker Safety and Employment
Principle 4 provides that "[f]orest management operations
shall maintain or enhance the long-term social and economic well-

Maritime Regional Standards, supranote 54, §§ 2.3 & 3.1.2.
German FSC Standards, supranote 54. The German document also notes
that under UN definitions there are no indigenous peoples in the country. See id.
146
See Swedish FSC Standard, supranote 54, § 4.2.
147
For an explanation of the potential importance of such rights, see Adriana
144
145

Fabra, Indigenous Peoples,Environmental Degradations,and Human Rights: a
Case Study, in HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENvIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

(Alan E. Boyle & Michael R. Anderson eds., 1996).
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being of forest workers...."' 4 Worker well-being is a major focus of
standards in a number of developed countries. The Swedish standard
says: "The enterprise is responsible for ensuring that the employees
have a good working environment, and for the prevention ofphysical,
mental and social ill-health."'49 It also provides:

In choosing work methods and work organization, and
in the procurement of equipment, the best overall
solution shall be selected, with due weight being
given to working environmental, outdoor
environmental and economic considerations. The
outdoor environment shall not be given priority at the
expense of the working environment. 50

Worker participation in drafting the standard is unmistakable.
The underlying discussion noted that workers operating large
harvesting machines are likely to be much safer than those walking
around in the woods with chain saws, and that the resultant
5
compaction of forest soil may therefore be acceptable.' '
The German draft standard is not quite as aggressive as the
Swedish one in making firms responsible for worker health, but it
does require that forest work be "organized and carried out in a way
that guarantees comprehensive health and safety protection" and that
"safety regulations are observed."'5 2 Forest managers must ensure the
rights of workers to join unions, keep employees informed about
enterprise developments, and allow workers to actively participate in
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FSC Principles and Criteria, supra note 6.

149

Swedish FSC Standard, supra note 54, § 4.1.3.

150

151

Id.
Personal communication.

152

German FSC Standards, supranote 54, § 4.2.
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processes which affect them. 53 Firms are also mandated to employ
workers throughout the year, if possible, and to provide continual
education courses for workers. 54 The practical meaning of "if
possible" remains to be worked out, and it will be interesting to see
if any changes in employment or operational policies result.
It is hard to know how much health and safety protection
certification might bring to workers in developing countries. Many
governments and spokesmen of developing countries have resisted
such standards on grounds that they would eliminate one of their key
economic advantages in world trade-- low labor costs.' Even ifFSC
certification becomes more widespread in developing countries,
prevailing economic conditions make worker protections as strong as
those in developed countries highly unlikely. A more likely policy
will be the protection of fundamental rights as currently defined by
the International Labor Organization:
a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the
right to collective bargaining;
b) elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor;
c) effective abolition of child labor; and
d) elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation' 56

See id. § 4.3.
See id. §§ 4.5 & 4.6.
155
See, e.g., Third World Intellectuals' and NGOs' Statement Against
Linkages, <http://www.columbia.edu/-jb38/twin-sal12.pdf> (arguing that
environmentalists tend to be well meaning but wrong in advocating the linkage of
worker rights and international trade, while some of their labor allies are simply
interested in preserving preferential market access for themselves).
156
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/10ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm>. In 1999 the FSC
153

154

general assembly voted to pro-actively include workers and trade unions in the FSC

and to build core ILO conventions into certification assessments. See FSC Draft
Minutes, supra note 14.
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If so, this will be progress in at least some cases. Two

commentators writing several years ago suggest a similar
accommodation under the Principles and Criteria:

Experience in the marketplace indicates that
consumers are concerned about social issues, such as
the rights of indigenous peoples or how a company
treats its employees. In most cases it appears the
public understands that assessment of social
conditions must first be considered within the regional
and cultural context, not the international context.
Current FSC policies require that certification should
assure that there are no obvious abuses and that basic
human rights are respected (indigenous land claims,
worker safety, and payment at or above the regional
157
minimum wages.)
In sum, FSC certification can be a positive force for human
rights in both developed and developing countries, but its actual
effects are unknown at present and are likely to vary considerably by
region.
3. Community
While community protection can be seen as part of the larger
human rights agenda, it is treated separately in this article for two
reasons. First, it is important to recognize that environmental
management affects the interests and dynamics of place-based
groups, and not only of individuals. Second, although indigenous
communities are at long last starting to receive some protection under
human rights instruments, progress for other place-dependent
communities has been much slower.

157

Heaton & Donovan, supranote 65, at 64-65.
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FSC Principle 4 mandates that forest management operations
maintain or enhance the long-term social and economic well-being of
local communities. This may be the vaguest ofthe FSC requirements,
since neither "social and economic well-being" nor "community" is
defined, and since it is far from obvious how much an enterprise must
or even can do to maintain or enhance them. There is, however,
something of an underlying vision to the principle. The idea is that
the community, and all its members, be in a productive and
harmonious relationship with the forest. The relationship is implicitly
reciprocal: the community takes care of the forest and the forest takes
care of the community. The promotion of certification can be seen as
an external movement to use global market forces to promote this
vision of the community-forest relationship.'58 Even so, how such a
relationship is actually defined will depend heavily on local
institutions and culture. At one extreme, a community could make all
of the decisions about managing the forest and control the flow of
benefits from it. At the other, it could rely on others to make
decisions that would provide it with an acceptable flow of benefits.
Where along the continuum a particular forest falls depends heavily
on ownership laws.
a) Community Control
The full control model applies primarily in forests owned by
communities.'59 Most community owned forests in developed

158

See Dominque Irvine, Certification and Community Forestry: Current

Trends, Challenges, and Potential (backround paper prepared for the World
Bank/WWF Alliance Workshop on Independent Certification, Washington, D.C.,

Nov. 9-10, 1999) (on file with author). One certification organization is a promoter
of community forestry certification. Smartwood has virtually specialized in
community forestry. It has established local organizational partners in twelve
countries to help increase local expertise on and access to certification. See idat 6.
159
Community forests here are distinguished from state or nationally owned

forests. Whereas place-based communities have primary decision making authority
with regard to community forests, they are generally only one constituency among
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countries seem to operate with relatively clear rights and governance
structures, which often have been worked out over long periods of
time. 6 ' Thus, although communities may have to operate within an
overarching state or federal legal framework, their right to control the
overall management of the forest is rarely subject to doubt. Often the
difficulty is that forest policies have also become traditional, and
therefore difficult to change. In general, however, the closer the daily
life of a community is to the management of its forest, the easier it is
to mobilize for policy decisions regarding the forest. 6 ' Whether a
community decides to change its forest management policy or not is
a separate question from that of whether it may do so if it wishes.
In developing countries there has been a broad effort to
expand the practice of community forestry. This is in response to
many unsatisfactory experiences of communities with industrial
forestry operations, which can provide very low economic returns to
the community while destroying its ability to obtain a reliable supply

many seeking to influence the management of state and national forests, which are

typically managed by large bureaucracies under centrally generated mandates.
160
Such governance structures can be quite complex. In Germany, for
example, community forests are often managed for communities by the state
forestry administration, and must conform to federal and state laws as well as to

community mandates. See Ulrich Schraml & Klaus B6swald, A National Forest
Programme for Germany? Planning and Implementation of Forest-Related
Activities in a Highly Industrializedand Densely Populated Country, in PETER
GLOCK ET AL., FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL FOREST
PROGRAMMES, VOLUME II: STATE OFTHE ARTIN EUROPE 107 (1999). In one recent

case of a large-scale group certification of many community-owned forests in the
state of Rheinland Pfalz, the communities had to exert considerable pressure in
order to prevail upon the state administration to undertake FSC certification. The
forest administration agency apparently sees certification as an implicit criticism
of its management practices and resents the incursion on its prerogatives by
environmentalists. Personal communications.
161
The concept of "daily life" here includes forest product-based work and
general recreation. Both types of relationships have supported efforts to seek
certification.
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of plants, animals, and fresh water from the forest. 62 Certification of
community managed forests offers a potential way to both increase
the community's control over its forest and give it access to global
markets.' The challenges can be quite complex, however. This is
sometimes because property rights and governance structures are less
definite, and communities are uncertain of their capacity to actually
control the management of forests over substantial time periods.'
But challenges can also derive from latent problems in the definition
of "community" and its relation to economic enterprise. In Mexico,
for example, approximately 80 percent of forested land is held by
about 8000 different communities, most of which are indigenous.' 65
These communities vary enormously in structure and management
capacity.' 66 This means at the outset that certifiers will often find it
difficult to understand local communities, and to discern what
practices will legitimately contribute to their "well-being."
Moreover, community governance structures may not be
consistent with good forest management, as understood by certifiers,
the FSC system, or the international forestry community. In Oaxaca,
162

See Deutsche Gesellschaft fdr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Forest

Certification Project, Newsletter, No. 4, Nov. 1999, at 2 [hereinafter GTZ,

Newsletter] (on file with author).
163
As of late 1999, twenty-three community forests had received FSC
certification. Most of them were in "natural" forests, in other words forests that had

not previously been used for industrial production. The majority also involved
certification of multi-community forests. Most of the communities involved
agriculturists who had no experience with industrial production of timber, much
less producing itforthe international market. Although the great majority involved
management by community organization, in one case a community gave a
concession to a company to manage community forest land under community
guidelines. See Irvine, supranote 158, at 2-4.
164
See id.
165
See Matthew D. Markopoulos, Community Forest Enterprise and
Certificationin Mexico: A Review of Experience with Special Reference to the
Union of Zapotec and Chianantec Forestry Communities (UZACHI), Oaxaca,
Report to the International Institute for Environment and Development, September
1999, at 1.
166
See id. at21.
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for example, community forests are generally managed on the cargo
system, which involves the rotation of management positions every
one to three years, depending on the location. 67 The system is
intended to limit corruption and inequality, and also to increase
training opportunities for community members. Unfortunately, it
makes continuity in management policy difficult, since new managers
might not understand the policies of their predecessors, and may
change them in any event. 6 ' Problems can be compounded by the
fact that all community members are eligible to vote for managers,
regardless of their understanding of forestry issues, creating a real
69
possibility that people not well suited to the jobs are elected.
Some Mexican communities are considering responding to
management inefficiencies by changing their procedures, for
example, by using "handing over" periods between rotations and
imposing qualification requirements for certain positions. 70 Certifiers
have occasionally requested such changes as conditions of
certification. 171 Many other traditional communities with informal
governance structures also find it difficult to meet the management
system criteria of certification." Directly and indirectly, therefore,
certification can imply changing community governance structures
that have purposes other than effective forest management. And
evaluating whether this is a good thing is neither a straightforward
matter, nor necessarily something that can be done by certifiers.
At this stage it is hard to know how much change in
communities might occur as a result of certification. It is fair to
wonder, however, whether the FSC's concept of community and its
relationship to forest management is sufficiently sophisticated to deal
with the complexity of traditional real-world communities and their
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See id at 45.
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See id.
See id.
See id.
See id at v.
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See Scrase, supra note 52.
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relationship to the management of complex enterprises in the global
marketplace. As one knowledgeable observer with developingcountry experience commented: "One has to be very careful of one's
expectations. Otherwise one ends up saying, 'you're a community
and you're expected to become an international business.""'73
b) Community Participation
The FSC certification program provides two general avenues
for community participation. The first is in the standard setting
process, where the existence of the social chamber and recent efforts
to expand its effectiveness have given community members new
voices in policy making. 74 The second is in the certification process,
where communities that do not own forests are supposed to have
input in forest policy through community participation processes. The
Maritime standard, for example, requires that management consider
social impacts, and that "[a]s appropriate to the size of the ownership
and the circumstances ofthe local community, local communities and
community organizations directly affected by forestry activities must
be given an opportunity to participate in the setting of forest
management goals and in forest management planning."' 7 5 Its
compliance indicators, however, require only that the enterprise
publicize its operational activities and consider community
feedback.176 Similarly, the German standard provides that "[t]he local
population has the opportunity to get informed about and to comment
77
on management processes which affect them directly." 1
Certifiers have attempted to impose similar and possibly
stronger requirements in developing countries. In northern Honduras,

174

Personal communication.
See Irvine, supranote 158, at 6.

175

Maritime Standards, supranote 54, § 4.4.2.
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See id.
j
German FSC Standards, supranote 54, §4.9. Use ofthe term "population"
conveniently avoids the problem of defining the relevant community.
176
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for example, where small groups of campesinos manage areas of
publicly owned forest under usufructuary agreements, the certifier
required community participation in forest management. However,
that effort confronted a two-fold problem.' 78 First, the campesino
groups were struggling to meet the technical and operational demands
of the international market and had little capacity to manage more
complicated decision making. Second, the local population was
highly fragmented and geographically mobile, and had little capacity
for meaningful community deliberation. Indeed, it was arguable from
a sociological perspective to what degree place-based communities
existed. 9 In Markopoulos' analysis, imposed participation

178

See Matthew D. Markopoulos, The Impacts ofCertificationon Campesion

Forestry Groups in Northern Honduras, Report to the Int'l Inst. for Env't. and
Dev., Jan. 1999, at 44 [hereinafter Markopoulos, Honduras].
179
See id.at 45. Markopoulos' analysis deserves quotation:
Community forest management is a fashionable concept. Like all
community-based approaches to sustainable development,
however, it is based on a number of assumptions about
community, environment and the relationship between them...
. The fundamental assumptions are that a distinct, homogeneous
community actually exists, and that it is capable of collective
action towards common economic and environmental goals. In
the campesinocommunities of the Atldntida region, there is little
justification for either of these assumptions. These communities
have formed on the agricultural frontier, and many are no more
than 20 to 30 years old. In many cases, what is officially
recognised as 'community' is no more than a loose
agglomeration of socially differentiated families. The
composition of such communities is constantly changing, as new
immigrants arrive or as established members leave to seek work
in nearby urban centres or abroad. As a result of these
movements, communities are becoming increasingly more
heterogeneous, and mutual interests and relations of trust
progressively weaker. Under such circumstances, the assumption
that resource use could be regulated by community-level
structures is clearly flawed.
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requirements actually endangered the enterprises' ability to generate
economic returns that would benefit the region and possibly support
the growth of more meaningful communities over time. 8 '
Nonetheless, it is possible that in other situations community
participation requirements will create more productive relationships
between enterprises and communities and possibly help strengthen
communities, as was evidently the case in Bolivia.' However, it will
always be a difficult job to figure out where and to what degree this
is possible, and to create the mechanisms to bring about the desired
results.
c) Community Benefits
Whether tacitly recognizing a tension between economic
performance and community participation or not, regional and
national standards developed to date tend to concentrate on economic
benefits to communities. The Swedish standard, for example, does
not mention community participation in management. Rather, it
exhorts managers to support communities by practicing responsible
long-term forestry, and to pay particular attention to "recreational
values of forest environments for the local population."'18 2 The
Maritime standard stresses employment and other benefits to the
community, and operation of enterprises to avoid or minimize
damage to other community activities. 8 3 The same is true of the

See id.
See Markopoulos, Bolivia, supranote 66, at 43. Indeed, in principle it is
even possible that certification processes promoting community forestry could
contribute to the establishmentof communities, where none or only the rudiments
previously existed. Integrated economic activity has often been the basis for the
formation and integration of local communities, and there is no inherent reason
why it could not be so in developing countries. See ROLAND L. WARREN, THE
COMMUNITY IN AMERICA (2nd ed. 1972).
Swedish FSC Standard, supra note 54, § 4.3
182
183
See Maritime Standards, supranote 54, §§ 4.1-4.5.
ISO
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British standard. 84 Given their modest nature, it seems unlikely that
these criteria will have large effects on enterprise-community
relationships. Nonetheless, they do express a recognition of some
level of responsibility to the local community on the part of the forest
enterprise.
In sum, the possible effects ofcertification on community run
from reinforcing responsible business practices to requiring serious,
decision-influencing dialogues between forest enterprises and the
communities. The location of FSC certification on the continuum is
likely to vary by region and culture. No matter where the process
occurs, however, achieving serious dialogue between enterprises and
communities is likely to require developing new relationships and
decision making processes. Moreover, that process may involve
strengtheningor even creating communities, and not merely giving
preexisting communities access to decision making. Markopoulous'
study of Bolivia, for example, suggests that the certification process
identified weaknesses in social and political relations, and led to some
important improvements over time.8 5 On the other hand, as his study
of Honduras suggests, improving community relationships can be
difficult where the economic viability of forest enterprises and the
social viability of communities is weak. 8 6 Thus, certification in
developing communities will require sophisticated judgments about
local social capacity and how best to build it. Certification will also
require deciding to what degree communities should be directly
involved in operational decisions and to what extent their interests
should be protected by involvement in policy and rulemaking. For
these reasons, however, the community aspect of certification may be
one of the most intellectually and politically fertile in years to come.

Endorsed FSC Standard for Great Britain, §§ 4.1-4 (Oct. 1998)
<http://www.fsc-uk.demon.co.uk/Standards5th.html>.
185
See Markopoulos, Bolivia, supranote 66, at 43.
186
See Markopoulos, Honduras, supranote 178.
184
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III. The International Organization for Standardization
A. Mission and Organization
Founded in 1947,'87 the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) is the oldest and largest player in the private
environmental regulatory arena. Its mission is "to promote the
development of standardization and related activities in the world
with a view to facilitating international exchanges of goods and
services, and to developing cooperation in the spheres of intellectual,
scientific, technological and economic activity." I It does this largely
through the publication of certification standards, guidance
documents, and technical reports, of which there are thousands on
89
subjects varying from screw threads to in-vitro testing.1
The ISO is organized as a federation of more than 130
nationally-based standard setting bodies. 90 The national
organizations are usually incorporated under public law, but do not
operate as government agencies.' 9' Most ground-level standard
development is done in over 200 subject-specific technical
committees, which are further broken down into subcommittees and

It also had a predecessor organization called the International Federation
of the National Standardising Associations (ISA), which was founded in 1926 but
ceased operation early in World War II. See Pierre Hauselmann, ISO Inside Out:
ISO andEnvironmentalManagement,WWF International Discussion Paper (1997)
at 4.
187

188

8, at 28.

ISO, Memento 1997 at 3, quotedinElliott, Forest Certification, supranote

See ISO website catalog <http://www.iso.ch/projects/ics.html>.
See generally the ISO website, <http://www.iso.ch/infoe/intro.htm>.
There are currently about 90 "member bodies"-- national organizations taken to
be most representative of standardization in their countries. There are also about
eleven "subscriber members" from countries with less developed economies and
37 "correspondent members" from countries that do not have fully developed
standards bodies. Id. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is the
official U.S. member body in ISO.
191
See Hauselmann, supranote 187, at 4.
189
190
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working groups. National organizations often form technical advisory
groups (TAGs) to provide input to technical committees. ISO's
annual operating budget is over $125 million US.' 92
Early in its history the ISO concentrated on setting standards
for products such as metal bolts and photographic film. More recently
it has set standards for automatic teller machines and phone cards.
After decades of largely unheralded expansion, the ISO turned its
focus to production processes and systems - including management
systems. It established an initial management system requirement in
the late 1980s, as part ofa larger set of"ISO 9000" quality procedures
and practices standards. These standards were the first to apply to
many types of industries, and to be built essentially from scratch.193
They quickly became "de facto requirements" for doing business in
Europe and other parts of the world. 194
An important impetus in the rapid development of the ISO
environmental standards was the desire of multi-national corporations
to head off a flurry of national environmental standard setting
initiatives, some focusing on management systems, others on
information disclosure.'95 The ISO organization also took the
opportunity provided by the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment
and Development to "do something" for the environment. 196 Shortly
after the conference, the ISO's Strategic Action Group on the
Environment ("SAGE") concluded that an ISO environmental
standard could contribute to world standardization, improve

192
193

See id.at 5.
See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private Voluntary Standard-Setting, the

InternationalOrganizationfor Standardization,andInternationalEnvironmental
Lawmaking, in GONTHER HANDL, 6 YRBK OF INT. ENVTL. L. 107, 119 (1995).

See id ISO 9000 certification was required for a number of regulated
products covered by EC directives, and also to sell to government controlled
entities throughout Europe. Some U.S. government agencies also add it to their
procurement requirements. See id at 120.
195
See Jennifer Nash & John Ehrenfeld, Code Green: Business Adopts
194

Voluntary EnvironmentalStandards,38 ENV'T 16-45 (1996).
196

See id.See also infra note 29.
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environmental performance, and facilitate world trade. 97 The ISO
then decided to establish a new committee on environmental
management to begin promulgating series "ISO 14000"
environmental standards and guidelines. The committee, Technical
Committee 207 (TC207), operates independently of TC 176, which
produced the ISO 9000 series.

The primary standard, ISO 14001, was completed in 1997.198
It establishes the firm as the primary mover in environmental policy,
and the environmental management system as the primary
mechanism. It contains no substantive, performance-based criteria.
Proposals for sector-specific standards were rejected early in the
development process, 199 as were suggestions for general substantive
standards, such as best management practice or best available
technology, which American representatives in particular worried
might lead to increased civil or criminal liability."'

197

See Tom Tibor & Ira Feldman, ISO 14000: A GUIDE TO THE NEW

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STANDARDS

32 (1995).

TC 207 working groups have also established a number of guidelines for
ISO related processes, including guidelines for (a) environmental auditing (ISO
14010, 14011, 14012), (b) environmental assessments of sites and entities(ISO
14015), (c) guidelines for environmental labels and declarations (ISO
14020,21,24,25), (d) environmental performance evaluation (ISO 14031), (e) life
cycle assessment (ISO 14040, 14041, 14042, 14043), and (f) vocabulary (ISO
14050). These guidelines are formally non-binding, but are expected to have a
significant effect on corporate information gathering and decision making over
time. See generally American National Standards Institute Website,
<http://www.ansi.org/public/isol400O/docs_6.html>. It should be noted that the
labeling guidelines, some of which are still being developed and which are not
reviewed in any detail this article (in particular ISO 14025, applicable to third party
certification), could have a significant effect on environmental certification
programs.
199
Proposals for a forestry-specific standard were rejected, but had enough
strength to generate a special working group. See Roht-Arriaza, supranote 193, at
158. The working group produced a report in 1998: ISO/TR 14061, Information
to Assist ForestryOrganizationsin the Use ofEnvironmentalManagementSystem
StandardsISO 14001 and 14004.
198

200

See id. at 124.
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B. Program Elements
1. Firm-Centered Environmental Policy
ISO 14001 is unambiguous about the center of environmental
policy- making. While environmental law is treated as a given, new
policy development occurs in the firm.

4.2 Environmental Policy [emphasis added]
Top management shall define the organization's
environmental policy and ensure that it
a)
is appropriate -to the nature, scale and
environmental impacts of its activities, products or
services;
b)
includes a commitment to continual
improvement and prevention of pollution;
c)
includes a commitment to comply with
relevant environmental legislation and regulations,
and with other requirements to which the
organization subscribes;
d)
provides the framework for setting and
reviewing environmental objectives and targets;
e)
is documented, implemented and
maintained and communicated to all employees;
f)
is available to the public.2 ° '

ISO, International Standard 14001, Environmental management systems-Specification with guidance for use, § 4.2.
201
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2. Environmental Management System
The crown jewel of the ISO 14000 regime is the
environmental management system (EMS) defined in Section 14001;
the other ISO 14000 series guidelines seek to clarify possible ways of
operating the EMS. Practitioners talk in terms of "installing an
environmental management system" in the organization," 2 thus
invoking an image of the firm as a machine that can be redesigned
and rebuilt to maximize selected functions.2 3 As noted in the FSC
section, the basic idea of an EMS is to have organizational
arrangements for setting environmental goals, pursuing them,
monitoring achievement, and revising goals and plans. Accordingly,
the EMS can be conceptualized as a series of components for
planning, implementation, monitoring, and corrective action. An
EMS need not be installed in an entire company, but rather may be
installed in a "single operating unit."2
a) Planning
The planning component must identify all environmental
aspects of the organization's activities, catalogue all applicable
environmental legal and other requirements, set and document
environmental objectives and targets,20 5 and establish a program for
achieving them.20 6 The organization is to consider the views of
interested parties in setting objectives, but the standard does not

See J.L. Hutchins, ISO 14000 EnvironmentalManagement Systems -CurrentDevelopments, 5 ILL. ENVTL. L. LTR.22-26 (1996); Christopher Sheldon
202

& Mark Yoxon,

INSTALLING ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A STEP-

BY-STEP GUIDE (1998).
203
Any such redesign must be done within the general framework of
maximizing shareholder wealth, of course.
204
ISO 14000 § 3.1.2. "Operating unit" is not defined in the standard.
205

The objectives are to be specific, and the targets measurable wherever

practicable. See ISO 14000 Annex A, § A.3.3.
206
See ISO, International Standard 14001, supranote 201, §§ 4.3.1-4.3.4.
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indicate on what information interested parties will base their
views.2" 7 "Environmental aspects" are broadly defined to include all
of the organization's interactions with the environment,20 8 but the
organization need not disclose information on them to the public.
Examples of potentially applicable "other requirements" than legal
ones include industry codes of practice and agreements with public
authorities.20 9 The program must assign responsibility for reaching
objectives and targets to particular parts of the organization and
include means and a time frame.210
b) Implementation and operation
The implemented EMS must define, document, and
communicate management roles, responsibilities and authorities. 21'
The organization is to provide essential resources for implementation,
including financial, technical and human ones, and must also
designate officers responsible for overall implementation of the EMS
and reporting on its performance.212 The EMS must also provide for

See id. § 4.3.3. "Interested party" is defined as "an individual or group
concerned with or affected by the environmental performance of an organization."
Id § 3.1.1
207

208

Related "guidance" documents detail the environmental review process

(ISO 14004), elements of environmental auditing (the ISO 14010 series),
environmental site assessment (ISO 14015), environmental labeling (the ISO 14020
series), environmental management performance evaluation (ISO 14031, 14032),
environmental life cycle assessment (the ISO 14040 series) and terms and
definitions (ISO 14050).
209
See ISO 14000 Annex A, § A.3.2.
210
See ISO, International Standard 1400 l,supranote 201, § 4.3.4. Although
ISO is developing non-binding product "life-cycle" guidelines, the environmental
management system standard only applies to "those environmental aspects which
the organization can control and over which it can be expected to have an
influence." ISO 14001:1996(E)§1
211
See ISO, International Standard 14001, supranote 201, § 4.4. 1.
212

See id.
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employee training,2 13 internal and external communication
procedures, 214 and for up-to-date, accessible documentation.2 15 The
organization must identify operations necessary to success, and
procedures for their control. 216 Finally, the organization must
establish and maintain a system for responding to emergencies,
and for preventing or mitigating associated environmental
impacts.217 It must also test emergency procedures periodically and
review and revise them whenever any emergencies occur.218
Importantly, as many commentators have pointed out, the
EMS is not required to achieve compliance with legal and other
requirements, only to attempt to do so. This possibility was vividly
illustrated recently when an American company announced that it had
achieved ISO 14001 certification on the same day that it was served
with notices of Clean Air Act violations by the Environmental
Protection Agency.219

c) Monitoring
Information production and monitoring are given an important
role in the system:

The organization shall establish and maintain
documented procedures to monitor and measure, on a

See id § 4.4.2
See id. § 4.4.3
See id. §§ 4.4.4,4.4.5
See id. § 4.4.6
See id. § 4.4.7
217
See id.
218
219
See Jennifer Shapira, PA Company Violates CleanAirAct,CertifiestoISO
14001, INT'L ENVTL. SYS. UPDATE, 6(6) 8-8 (June 1999). To some degree, this
illustrates the distinction between an environmental management system and an
environmental compliance system, but it is quite unlikely that even a compliance
system would achieve perfect compliance.
213

214
215
216
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regular basis, the key characteristics of its operations
and activities that can have a significant impact220 on
the environment. This shall include the recording of
information to track performance, relevant operational
controls and conformance with the organizations
environmental objectives and targets. 22'

The organization is specifically required to "establish and
maintain a documented procedure for periodically evaluating
compliance with relevant environmental legislation and
' and to maintain records of the monitoring process
regulations"222
"according to the organization's procedures." '23 These records need
not be made publicly available.224

"Significant impact" is not defined in the standard. It is clear only that not
every environmental impact need be significant, and that not every "environmental
aspect" need be an "environmental impact." Much discussion is underway among
practitioners regarding how to operationally define these terms.
221
ISO, International Standard 14001, supra note 201, § 4.5.1.
220

S
223

Id.
Id.

This is in direct contrast to the British provision which served as the
model for the ISO 14001. The BS 7750 Standard requires the organization to
maintain a public register of significant direct and indirect effects of products,
activities, and services. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 193, at 125. There are also
other efforts to create standardized information disclosure. The Coalition for
Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), for example, which had been
working for some time on a global initiative to encourage companies to use
standardized measurement methods for activities such as product performance,
energy use, and non-product output, recently joined with a number of other efforts
in the Global Reporting Initiative, which is working to develop a comprehensive
set of"sustainability" indicators (not just environmental ones). See Kara Sissell,
ManagementSystems Win Over Regulators, 161 CHEM. WK. 37 (Apr. 14, 1999).
See generally the GRI website <http://www.globalreporting.org>.
224

1999-2000] PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 191
d) Corrective Action
The organization must have procedures for "defining
responsibility and authority for handling and investigating
nonconformance," as well as for taking mitigating and corrective
action.225
e) EMS Audit
The firm must "establish and maintain programme(s) and
226
procedures for periodic environmental management system audits."
It must also periodically evaluate its compliance with environmental
laws and regulations.227 The audits are to determine whether the EMS
conforms to planned arrangements and has been properly
implemented. The procedures must cover "audit scope, frequency and
procedures," as well as responsibilities for conducting and reporting
audits.228
The standard does not specify who is to conduct the audit, and
allows for both internal and external (third-party) audits.229 Moreover,
most ISO practitioners make a firm distinction between an EMS audit
and an audit of legal compliance,23 although the USEPA and the
Multi-State Working Group on Environmental Management Systems
are also trying to "blend" the two concepts. 3 '

227

See ISO, International Standard 14001, supranote 201, §4.5.2.
Id. § 4.5.4b.
See id. § 4.5.1.

228

See id.

225
226

See id.See also §A.5.4 of the Annex, which is "informative," rather than
binding: "Audits may be performed by personnel from within the organization
and/or by external persons selected by the organization. In either case, the persons
conducting the audit should be in a position to do so impartially and objectively."
230
E.g., Jack Kanholm, ISO REQUIREMENTS: 61 REQUIREMENTS CHECKLIST
AND COMPLIANCE GUIDE (1998).
229

23

Multi-State Working Group on Environmental Management Systems,

EMSs, Environmental Performance, and Compliance (Dec.

13,

<http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/pollprev/mswg/compliance.htm>.
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f)Management Review

Top management is required to review the EMS to "ensure its
continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness." 23 2 The review
must consider the need for changes to "policy, objectives and other
elements" of the EMS in light of audit results, changing
circumstances, and the commitment to continual improvement.
3. Continual Improvement
The primary goal-based driver in the standard is the
requirement that the organization design the EMS to pursue continual
improvement, which is defimed as a "process of enhancing the
environmental management system to achieve improvements in line
with the organization's environmental policy."2 '33 The standard
explicitly provides that the "process need not take place in all areas
of activity simultaneously." 4 Also, it should be noted that it is the
EMS that is to be continually improved - not environmental
performance. This policy was a source of intense debate during the
drafting process, with European delegations advocating a
performance-based criterion, and U.S. and some other delegations
advocating a management system criterion for continual
improvement. 35 It is possible, however, that the standard as written
will eventually be taken to require improved performance. The
argument would be that because an EMS includes objectives and
targets, an improved EMS will necessarily include improved
objectives and targets, and that a properly implemented system will
necessarily advance toward them. Whether this possibility is realized
will be important to watch.

232

ISO, International Standard 14001, supranote 201, § 4.6

233

Id.§3.1.
Id.

234
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See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 193, at 122.
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4. Prevention of Pollution
The standard also includes a commitment to "prevention of
pollution," which is defined as "use of processes, practices, materials
or products that avoid, reduce or control pollution, which may include
recycling, treatment, process changes, control mechanisms, efficient
use of resources and material substitution.2 36 This provision is quite
controversial because it allows for the possibility of using so-called
"end-of-pipe" technologies to reduce pollution, as well as input
changes, process changes and the like.237
5. Auditing and Registration
Although firms are not required to use third-party auditors,
they must do so in most countries if they wish to register themselves
as certified. The ISO has fairly elaborate arrangements for the
accreditation of certifiers. These are handled by the national member
bodies, often through contracts with accreditation firms.2 3' There are
currently 22 accredited certifiers in the US, and nine additional
applicants for accreditation.239

ISO, International Standard 14001, supranote 201, § 3.13.
E.g., Joel A. Tickner, ISO 14,000: Will It Deter CleanerProduction? 8
NEW SOLUTIONS 285-308 (1998).
238
See Stephen Bass, FSC and ISO Approaches to ForestCertification:A
Comparison and Suggested Ways Forward (DG-VIII Forest Certification
236

237

Advisory Group, Forest Certification Note 2, 1997)
<http://www.efi.fi/publications/Discussion-Papers/0 1.pdf>.
239
See Registrar
Accreditation
Board
Website,
<http://www.rabnet.com/cgi/>. EPA has also funded establishment of a blue
ribbon panel to review the operation and rigor of the ANSI/RAB accreditation
process, but no results are publicly available at this writing.
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C. Program Operation
1. Standard Setting
a) By the ISO
As noted above, most ISO standard setting work is done
through technical committees, subcommittees, technical advisory
groups, and working groups. The Technical Committee developing
the 14000 series, TC207, has a membership including 85 national
bodies; fewer than forty, however, have participated with any
frequency.240 TC207's work is divided among the main committee
and six subcommittees: Environmental Management Systems (EMS),
Environmental Auditing and Related Investigations (EA&RI),
Environmental Labels and Declarations (EL), Environmental
Performance Evaluation (EPE), Life Cycle Assessment (LCA), and
Terms and Definitions (T&D). 24 1 Most of the subcommittees have
completed some guidance documents and are currently working on
others in their areas of interest. The guidance documents are not
binding for certification purposes, but are nonetheless expected to be
influential in shaping the implementation of ISO 14001. The
subcommittees' drafting efforts are augmented by approximately 18
working groups, which do much of the initial drafting work.242
The very complexity of the TC207 organization makes its
work difficult to follow. Doing so would require a relatively wellfunded, sophisticated organization. Early on, corporate interests from
large industrialized countries dominated the ISO 14000 drafting
process. 243 Over time, more governments, developing countries, and
NGOs became involved, but by then many of the fundamental

240

Personal observations and communications.

241

See Hauselman, supra note 187, at 6.

242

See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 193, at 141.

243

See id.
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decisions had been made. 2" In principle, the national standard setting
organizations represented on the technical committees are responsible
for convening balanced sets of interests and bringing their input into
the writing process,245 but it is not clear how many do so, or how
often.2 46 In the case of TC207, it appears that much decision making
was done by people who could participate regularly and intensively
in the drafting process, and that these were often representatives of
large, transnational corporations. 247 This makes sense because
transnational corporations are most likely to have a strong interest in
international standardization, as well as in the organizational and
financial resources necessary to participate effectively in a process
scattered among many sub-committees and working groups meeting
in many different countries. Governmental agencies and NGOs, by
contrast, are likely to have more pressing priorities for the use of tight
budgets.
The dominance of large corporations did not prevent conflict
in the drafting process, since corporations often have conflicting
interests in different types of standards. Indeed, although the ISO
seeks to operate on a consensus basis,24 the TC207 processes have
often been sufficiently contentious to require votes.249 Virtually every
word of the ISO 14001 standard was vigorously fought over. On the
whole, environmental requirements were softened as time went on,
244

See id.

See id. at 140.
In a pioneering study that does not appear to have been replicated in the
U.S. or elsewhere, Hamilton found performance in the American context quite
245

246

inconsistent. See Robert J. Hamilton, The Role of NongovernmentalStandardsin
the Development ofMandatory FederalStandardsAffecting Safety or Health, 56

TEx. L. REv. 1329 (1978).
247
See Roht-Arriaza, supranote 193, at 41.
248
Consensus is defined as "general agreement, characterised by the absence
of sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the concerned
interests and by a process that involves seeking to take into account the views of
all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments. Note: consensus
need not imply unanimity." Elliott, Forest Certification, supra note 8, at 36.
249
See idat 10-11.
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often at the insistence of American or Asian firms. Examples include
the decision to require firms to commit to complying with applicable
legislation, rather than to comply with environmental laws; to require
"continual improvement" of the environmental management system,
rather than of environmental performance; 20 and to define
"prevention of pollution" as including end-of-pipe technologies.
b) By the Firm
Because firms are the primary locus of substantive
policymaking in the ISO system, they will be the primary source of
substantive standards in the ISO system. Thus, the standards that they
set in defining their plans, targets and objectives, will be crucial in
determining the impact of the system. Although many thousands of
firms are ISO 14000 certified,25 ' research for this article uncovered no
systematic information on their environmental policies and practices.
Until such research is done, it will be impossible to say much about
ISO standard setting.
For now assessments must be based on a general
understanding of how firms operate. It therefore seems likely that
standards will vary greatly depending on firms' internal cultures and
their external environments. External forces are likely to be
particularly important determinants offirm policies. Since firms must
publish their environmental policies, those located in areas with
sophisticated citizens' groups may feel effective pressure to

In forestry there has been considerable debate about the practical meaning
of "continuous improvement." Part of the debate is whether the standard should
250

improving on -- sometimes abysmal -- current practices or the degree of progress

toward ideal ones. In addition, there is the problem of what should be counted:
limits on clear cut areas, riparian buffer zones, use of wide-flotation tires, use of
remote sensing, etc. It is often pointed out that the overall condition of forests
worldwide is declining, and could easily continue to do so even as firms were
achieving "continuous improvement" from primitive practices.
251
Over 13,000 firms had been registered as of the end of 1999. See ISO
World Website, <http://www.ecology.or.jp/isoworld/english/analy 14k.htm>.
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promulgate policies demonstrating real environmental improvement,
rather than desultory improvements in their environmental
management systems. On the other hand, the fact that firms need not
reveal any information about their operations may limit the
effectiveness of citizens' groups, particularly in jurisdictions lacking
strong right-to-know laws.
A second category of factors potentially influencing firms to
establish strong policies is financial. Firms seeking external
financing, good insurance rates, and new investors may be inclined
to develop strong environmental policies in order to enhance their
strength in the marketplace.
Athird potential influence is the process of general discussion
and deliberation among certifiers, trade-associations, etc., which over
time could lead to relatively uniform standards and practices across
geographic areas. Whether and to what degree this might be
happening, however, is currently unknown, and it is counterbalanced
by the pressure on certifiers to meet the particularized expectations of
individual clients and preserve their confidentiality.
A final potential influence is regulatory. Firms may wish to
impress regulatory agencies with their environmental policies so as
to reduce their risks of inspection or even the standards they must
meet. Some states have already developed policies that accord special
treatment to firms achieving ISO 14001.252 The EPA is also
developing a program that places special emphasis on environmental

For example, the Connecticut "Act Concerning Exemplary Environmental
Management Systems" provides companies (1) with registered ISO 14001
252

environmental management systems, (2)that have adopted approved principles of
sustainability, and (3) that have good compliance records with: expedited permit
review, reduced fees, less frequent reporting, a facility wide permit for all

approvals, and public recognition of having attained this achievement. Connecticut
Public Act Number
99-226,
June 29,
1999
<http://www.cga.state.ct.us/ps99/Act/pa/1999PA-00226-ROOHB-06830-PA.htm>.

This provision came to my attention through the "voluntary codes" list-serve
maintained by Kemaghan Webb, a valuable source of information which can be
accessed at <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00973e.html>.
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management systems. 3 Given the scope of the phenomenon and the
complexity of the questions, it will take much time and research to
•determine whether and in what circumstances any of these factors
lead to significant changes in firms' environmental policies.
2. Certification Process
To date, approximately 15,000 companies world-wide have
been registered as ISO 14001 certified. Most ofthem are concentrated
in Asia and Western Europe." 4 Japan leads the world with over 2,500
certified companies."' Certification apparently costs anywhere from
$10,000 for a small company, to $50,000 to $100,000 for a mediumsized company,2 56 to $100,000 to $1 million for a large one. 2 " As
with the FSC process, the general contours ofthe certification process
are known, since they follow the standard itself,yet relatively little is
known about how certification actually works, or how it might
change firms' behavior. Some research is underway to learn about the
workings of the certification process, 258 but the standard's protection
of firm confidentiality, and the interests of both firms and certifiers
in retaining confidentiality, will make progress slow.

See USEPA
Office
of Pollution
Prevention,
<http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/index.htm>.
254
See ISO World Website,
<http://www.ecology.or.jp/isoworld/english/analyl4k.htm>.
255
See id.
256
See Tickner, supranote 237, at 296.
257
See James Cohen, More than 4000 Companies Certified Under ISO
14001: Japan,Europe Lead Way, 21 INT'L ENVTL.. REP. 650 (1998)
M
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, for example, is funding a
major project by the Environmental Law Institute and the University of North
Carolina. See Richard Andrews et al., The Effects of ISO 14001 Environmental
Management Systems on the Environmental and Economic Performance of
253

Organizations(Project Summary 1, March 27, 1999) (on file with author).
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D.
Implications for Environment, Human Rights, and
Community
1. Environment
Given the limited information about the actual workings of
the ISO 14000 system, inferences regarding its environmental effects
are tricky at best. It does seem clear that the system is expanding.
Several scholars have described it as a "de facto requirement for
doing business" around the world,259 though this assessment may be
a bit premature. Some governments seem likely to make compliance
with ISO standards a prerequisite to doing business in their
jurisdictions (perhaps the most important example being the
European Union). The South African government made certification
a condition ofprivatization for Sappi, the largest forestry company in
South Africa.26 Many governmental agencies, including some in the
US, are adding ISO 14001 certification to their purchasing criteria
and establishing other programs that promote ISO compliance.26 '
Some courts have ordered companies to comply with ISO standards
as remedies for violations of domestic environmental laws that do not
mandate ISO performance levels.262 A number ofmajor corporations,
including Ford Motor Company, have announced that, in addition to
having all of their own operations certified, they

259

See Virginia Haufler, PrivateSectorInternationalRegimes, 4 POLIBUS 1

(1998); Tickner, supra note 237, at 286.
See Thornber, Equity and Certification,supra note 18.

260

261

See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 193, at 149. See also Meidinger,

IncorporatingCertificationSystems, supranote 132.
262

See Kernaghan Webb, Voluntary Initiativesandthe Law, in VOLUNTARY

(R. Gibson ed.,
1998); Meidinger, IncorporatingCertificationSystems, supranote 132.
INITIATIVES AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CORPORATE GREENING
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will require all of their suppliers to be ISO certified in the next few
years.263 The World Trade Organization also strongly favors ISO
standards, since they are by definition international and ostensibly
consensual.2 "
While the growing influence of the ISO certification seems
clear, what effect it will have on environmental protection is less
clear. The system relies almost entirely on the effects of installing an
EMS in the firm. The key elements of an EMS are:

1. Production and analysis of extensive information
on the firm's environmental effects (but retention of
that information inside the firm);
2. Integration of environmental goals into general
management systems;
3. Continuous improvement in the environmental
management system; and
4. Response to public comments on the firm's
environmental management policy.

Because it contains no substantive environmental standards,
some commentators have argued that "on its own, ISO 14001 cannot
achieve sustainable industrial development or even environmental
performance improvement."2 61 This is probably an overly legalistic
judgment, which equates performance with outcome requirements
and fails to give due weight to organizational dynamics. It is hard to
believe that no firms will improve their environmental practices after
263

See Ford

265

RIvA KRUT & HARRIS GLECKMAN, ISO 14001: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

Motor Company Press Release, Sept. 21, 1999,
<http://www.tqm.com/wwwboard/msgs/811.html>. IBM and Xerox are also
seeking certification of all their operations and pushing their suppliers to do the
same. See 161 CHEM. WK. 37 (Apr. 14, 1999).
264
E.g., Hauselman, supranote 187.
FOR SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

25 (1998).
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gathering extensive information on their environmental aspects and
impacts, integrating environmental goals into their management
systems, and responding to public comments on their environmental
policies. Certainly some firms will be moved to make improvements
as a result of better information, management coordination, or
increased public pressure. Moreover, the ISO program requires a firm
to look at all of its environmental aspects, not just those regulated by
law. This is important because environmental laws are almost always
underinclusive, and firms may address problems through their
environmental management systems for which there are no
substantive legal or other standards. Still, it is impossible to say how
much improvement will occur, and even more difficult to say where
it will occur, since firms may make very different choices regarding
environmental goals depending on their local and financial situations.
The main way for the ISO system to yield predictable
environmental gains is for it to be linked to substantive standards.
Such linkage could happen in any of several ways. First, of course,
firms could embrace substantive standards. Indeed, there has been
considerable discussion about possible linkages between the ISO and
substantive systems. 2 6 The American Forest & Paper Association's
Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), in particular, publicly promotes
its standard as compatible with the ISO 14000 standard, as do the
Canadian Standards Association and the Pan European Forest
Certification Council (PEFC).267 Such linkages can be made through
the "other requirements" provision of Section 4.2(c), as discussed

266

E.g., Ira R. Feldman, Feldman, ISO 14000 Advocate Answers Krut's

Critique,Suggests "Sustainability" Role for InternationalStandard,ENVTL. L.
AND PRAC., Spring 1999; Elliott & Hackman, supranote 16; KRUT & GLECKMAN,
supra note 265; Dick Hortensius, ISO 14000 and ForestryManagement - ISO

Develops 'Bridging',ISO TC207 Webpage, <http://www.tc207.org/articles>. TC
207 produced a technical report, ISO/TR 14061, discussing bridging in the Forest
Industry. Id.
267
Seesupratextaccompanying note 5. The Canadian Standards Association
has also developed a forestry standard intended to be linked to ISO 14001
certification. See Elliott, Forest Certification, supranote 8.
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above, as well as through the requirements that the views of
interested parties be considered. Firms could also simply incorporate
them in their environmental targets. In practice, several major
European forestry firms, including AssiDomain and Korsnas, have
combined ISO 14001 and FSC certification.268 AssiDomain has taken
the position that the FSC and ISO standards are not only compatible,
but also complementary.269 Whether voluntary linkage becomes
widespread, however, remains to be seen. For now there appear to be
relatively few examples of it being done.
Substantive standards could also be imposed by law, and of
course existing legal standards are already incorporated in a soft way
through the commitment to comply with applicable laws. It is
possible that governments could define legal requirements
specifically applicable to firms seeking ISO 14000 certification in
their jurisdictions, but research to date has uncovered no examples of
that being done.
In sum, the ISO 14000 system's effects on environmental
protection are quantitatively indeterminate for the present and will be
for some time. Because of the organizational dynamics put in play,
however, it seems likely that the system will have positive
environmental effects in the companies that adopt it. Although it is
reasonable to assume that the mere collection and review of
information on the environmental implications of firm behavior may
lead to changed behavior, there seems to be very little research on
when and how firm behavior actually changes. Indeed, research by
King and Lennox on the American chemical industry's Responsible
Care program gives reason for pause, since it finds no superiority of
participating over nonparticipating firms, and indeed contains some

See Hortensius, supranote 266.
See Alan Pierce & Spencer Phillips, FSC-Certfied:A New Standardfor
Environmentally Responsible Paper,at 14 (The Wilderness Soc'y, Ecology &
Econ. Res., Occasional Paper VT-90-0 1)(on file with author).
268

269
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evidence that they may have lagged. ' Moreover, depending on how
much environmental policy making is removed from the public
domain into corporate decision making, it is possible that in the long
term the effects of the ISO initiative will be seen as negative. The
argument would be that focused state regulation would have achieved
greater progress, and could well lead to renewed and intensified
public regulation.
2. Human Rights
The ISO 14000 system does not directly address matters that
would normally be classified as human rights concerns. The
introductory section of 14001 states that it does not include
occupational safety and health issues, but is not intended to
"discourage" organizations from incorporating them in their
management systems either. The structural de-linking of
environmental from health and safety concerns seems curious,
especially since many corporations seem to have been moving toward
linking them in their management structures in recent years. 27'
Overall, it is hard to see the ISO system as a significant step for
human rights. The only way a positive human rights effect can be
inferred is to the degree that "better" management is correlated with
better human rights treatment -- an uncertain proposition at best.
3. Community
As noted above, the overall thrust of the ISO 14000 system is
to commit as much environmental decision making as possible to the
firm. The firm has no substantive duties to the community, and the
community role in decision making is limited to commenting on the

270

See Andrew King & Michael Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without

Sanctions: The ChemicalIndustry'sResponsible CareProgram,ACAD. OF MGMT.

J. (forthcoming) (on file with author).
271
See Tickner, supranote 237.
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company's environmental policy. Given the lack of information
disclosure requirements in the ISO system, communities will often
have little information about company operations upon which to base
their comments. In addition, the ISO system is highly international,
making it difficult for local communities to get a purchase on it. To
participate effectively, communities will likely have to rely upon
local laws giving them information about company operations and on
the independent expertise of their members.272 Thus, on the whole it
seems unlikely that the ISO system will enhance the role of
communities in environmental management. There are some factors
that militate in the opposite direction, such as the need to clothe ISO
certification with political credibility, but they all depend on factors
outside the ISO system.273

272

For an example of how community advocates can use information and

local laws to leverage decisional power, see R. Nils Olsen, Jr., The Concentration
of CommercialHazardous Waste Facilitiesin the WNY Community, 39 BUFF. L.
REv. 473 (1991); Gary Abraham Concepts of Community in Environmental
Discourse:Farmersvilleand Western New York's Garbage Wars, infra p.51 this
volume.
273
The EPA is interested in "stakeholder participation ...in development and

implementation" and "effect that such participation has on the public credibility of
the facility's EMS implementation." Environmental Protection Agency, EPA
Position Statement on Environmental Management Systems and ISO 14001 and a
Request for Comments on the Nature of the Data to be Collected from
Environmental Management System/ISO 14001 Pilots, 63 Fed. Reg. 12094-12097,
(1998).
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IV. The American Forest and Paper Association
A. Mission and Organization
The American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA)274
consists of approximately 130 major wood products and paper firms
representing 85% of U.S. paper production and 90% of U.S.
industrial timberland (approximately 13 percent of all US
timberland).275 Its mission is "to provide [its] members with
significant value in areas of business that are key to their success
where an association can be more effective than individual
companies. '' 211 The AF&PA pursues its mission by seeking to
influence policy, providing a forum for discussions among members,
and gathering a variety of statistics and other information. 27
The AF&PA founded the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI)
in 1994, in response both to the FSC and ISO programs and to
declining public credibility of the forest products industry. 28 There
was a widespread sense among its members that they needed to do
274

The AF&PA was founded in 1993, as a result of the merger of a trade

association which had represented the timber industry for about a hundred years
(the National Forest Products Association) and one that had represented the paper
industry for even a while longer (the American Paper Institute). See AF&PA Web
Page <http://www.afandpa.org/about/about.html>.
275
See Scott Berg & Rick Cantrell, AF&PA 's SF1 Program Promotes a
Higher Standard of Sustainable Forestry, J. OF FOREsTRY, Nov. 1999, at 33.
Approximately 60 per cent of the forest land in the U.S. is located in "nonindustrial" or small-woodlot lands, and another 25% in national, state, and
community forests. See Douglas Powell et al., Forest Resources of the United
States (U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Services General Technical Report
RM-234, 1992).
276
AF&PA Website <http://www.afandpa.org/aboutlabout.html>.
277

See id.
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See Errol E. Meidinger, Look Who's Making the Rules: the Roles of the

FSCand ISO in InternationalEnvironmentalPolicy, 4 HUM. ECOL. REv. 52-56

(1997); Joseph Rees, When Industries Question Their Morality: The Case of
IndustrialForestry in the United States (paper presented to the Law and Society
Ass'n., Aspen, CO, June 4, 1998) (on file with author).
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something to bolster their environmental credibility. At the same
time, they wanted to avoid "finger pointing" and competing with each
other on environmental issues.27 9 The SFI was the result. It is
designed to be compatible with ISO 14000 certification, and some of
its designers evidently expect that more and more firms will combine
the two over time.280 Participation in the SFI is a prerequisite to
AF&PA membership. It is the closest thing in this study to what is
often called "industry self-regulation. ' 28 ' I do not use the term in this
analysis, however, because it tends to obscure the conflicting groups
within the program. Approximately 15 firms were evidently asked to
leave the AF&PA when SFI became a membership requirement in
1996.282 The program has changed significantly from its inception to
the present. It began as an "industry code" of general principles to
which members subscribed and self-certified, but has developed more
institutional components over time. They are described below.
B. Program Elements
1. Principles and Objectives
Like the FSC, the AF&PA requires firms to commit to certain
substantive principles, such as practicing sustainable forestry and

279
280

Personal communications.
The ISO 14001 plans are most central in communications aimed at Europe

(e.g., Scott Berg, Sustainable Forestry and Certification Developments in the
United States, in CERTIFICATION OF SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT IN

COUNTRIES INTRANSITION (Jiri Skoblik & Kiri Mategjicek eds., 1998)). In the
United States, although many large forest products companies are ISO 9000
certified, the forestry sector seems to prefer a general "go-slow" attitude toward the
ISO 14000 series.
281

See e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:

TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
282
See Berg & Cantrell, supra note 275, at 33. The names of the firms
involved have not been released, and some firms evidently left the organization for
other reasons. Personal communications.
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protecting forest health. The principles are as follows (emphasis
added):

1. To practice sustainable forestry to meet the
needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs by
practicing a land stewardship ethic which integrates
the reforestation managing, growing, nurturing, and
harvesting of trees for useful products with the
conservation of soil, air and water quality, wildlife
and fish habitat, and aesthetics.
2. To use in its own forests, and promote among
other forest landowners, sustainable forestry practices
that are economically and environmentally
responsible.
3. To protect forests from wildfire, pests, diseases,
and other damaging agents in order to maintain and
improve long-term forest health and productivity.
4. To manage its forests and lands of special
significance (e.g., biologically, geologically, or
historically significant) in a manner that takes into
account their unique qualities.
5. To continuously improve the practice of forest
management and also to monitor, measure and report
the performance of our members in achieving our
commitment to sustainable forestry. 283

American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA), Sustainable Forestry
Initiative Standard (1999).
283
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These principles are given somewhat more detail in a series
of objectives and performance measures that take a prescriptive
format. The herbicide guideline, for example, provides as follows:

Objective 9. Continue the prudent use of forest
chemicals to improve forest health and growth while
protecting employees, neighbors, the public, and
sensitive areas, including streamcourses and adjacent
lands.
Performance Measures:
a. AF&PA members will meet or exceed all
applicable label requirements, laws, and regulations
concerning the use of fertilizers, herbicides, and other
forest chemicals needed to protect forest health and
increase growth."'
Others provide for prompt reforestation, use of EPA Best
Management Practices to protect water quality, trying to limit clear
cuts to 120 acres (48 hectares), protecting biological diversity,
reporting and the like. Many of them promise to support further
research.
In sum, many SFI principles and objectives sound similar to
the FSC ones, but tend to have a more industry-oriented spin. The use
of chemicals, for example, is portrayed as a necessary way of
protecting forest health rather than as a threat to forest health.
Nonetheless, the principles express a significant commitment to
environmental protection and are quite a distance from the "cut and
run" principles espoused by many old time forestry companies.2 81

284
285

Id
See Rees, supra note 278, at 22-23.
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Notably lacking from the principles are commitments to
indigenous and traditional use rights, worker safety,286 local
employment, and community involvement.8 7
2. Management Defined Policy
As in the ISO system, management prerogatives are central to
the SFI program, but they are protected in a more complex way. The
principles and objectives often refer to company management policy.
For example, each company "will define its own policies, programs,
and plans to implement and achieve" the SFI principles and
objectives. 88 Yet the principles and objectives impose a variety of
non-optional substantive standards. Those standards are themselves
defined by top managers, however, since they are based on the final
authority of the AF&PA Board of Directors, who are ultimately
responsible to the management of the AF&PA's corporate members.
Of course, as noted above, they may also respond to public opinion
to a significant degree.
3. Verification
Originally, the SFI program sought to verify company
compliance based solely on annual letters from company CEOs and
company responses to SFI questionnaires. After AF&PA staff
members reviewed the documents, the AF&PA publicly affirmed the

286

Worker safety is implied by the required proper handling of chemicals,

and is mentioned as part of the logger education program, but is quite peripheral
to the SFI program as a whole. It is also addressed by a separate set of AF&PA
principles described below, infra notes 322-23.

Although Objective 12 refers to "opportunities for the public and the
forestry community to participate in the commitment to sustainable forestry," its
performance measures are strictly limited to educational outreach from firms to
communities. And "forestry community" of course can be interpreted as being
limited to professionals and workers, as the SFI framework generally seems to do.
ISO, International Standard 14001, supra note 201, § 4.1.1.
288
287
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compliance of member companies.289 Third-party, on-the-ground
audits were purposefully excluded. In 1998, however, a "voluntary
verification" program was instituted. This step evidently was taken
partly on the recommendation of a newly created expert review
panel.290 It also reflected the widespread sense that the SFI program
did not have broad public credibility.29 '
The verification program now generally follows the ISO
model, allowing for first-, second-, or third-party verification. All
verifiers are to be "wholly independent." This criterion is not wholly
defined, but for first-party verifiers it at least means not being
"accountable to those directly responsible for the forestry
operations." 292 For third-party verifiers, it means not having provided
consulting or other services to the organization being certified within
the preceding year. 293 The AF&PA has also defined minimal
qualifications for verifiers. Verification team members need a
professional forestry degree plus two years experience, or a high
school education plus five years work experience, both with
"sufficient on-the-job training." 294 Verification team leaders need the
same qualifications, plus either ISO 14001 accreditation or a course
in auditing approved by a national standards body.295 At least one

289

Personal communications.

See Statement of Expert Review Panel Chairman Paul Hansen, 1999 4"'
Annual Progress Report, AF&PA Sustainable Forestry Initiative, at 2.
291
Personal communications. See also statement of AF&PA President and
290

CEO, W. Henson Moore: "Because public expectation of environmental

stewardship continues to evolve, we've developed a voluntary verification
program ...... 1999 4' Annual Progress Report, AF&PA Sustainable Forestry
Initiative, at 1.
292

§ 6.

AF&PA Voluntary Verification Principles and Procedures (AF&PA-200 1)

See id.
AF&PA Qualification Criteria for Verifiers (AF&PA-2002). Years spent
pursuing a professional degree can be credited against the work experience
requirement.
29S
See id National standards bodies include the American national Standards
Institute (ANSI), the American Standards and Testing Materials Society (ASTM),
293
294
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member of a third-party verification team must be a professional
forester as defined by the Society of American Foresters. 96 Unlike
the FSC, the AF&PA does not itself approve certifiers, and unlike the
ISO, it does not have a registration system for them. The AF&PA
also has a list of indicators that might be used to operationalize the
SFI objectives, although it stresses that the list is illustrative, that
individual indicators will not apply to every organization, and that the
list is likely to change over time. 97
The organization to be verified can be either an entire firm or
a distinct part of a firm that has its own functions and
administration.298 In either case, the organization has a great deal of
control over the verifier and the results. It chooses the verifier and
must agree to the verification plan in advance; it must also approve
any changes in the plan.29 9 The organization's confidentiality is

and the Canadian Standards Association (CSA). Such courses typically cost
between $1500 and $2500. Personal communication.
296
See AF&PA-2002, supranote 294, § 7.
See SFI Voluntary Verification Indicators (AF&PA-2003) (1999).
297
See AF&PA-2001, supra note 292, § 4. This reflects the expanded
298
availability of the SFI system to non-members through licensing. See supratext
accompanying notes 312-13.
299
See AF&PA-2001, supranote 292, § 8. Early indications are that firms
choosing to seek verification are inclined to use big name, but also familiar firms:
Champion in particular went through a pretty meticulous
interview process. They had bids from I think ten or twelve
different auditing firms, and they announced that they were
going with Price Waterhouse up in Vancouver, British
Columbia. They had worked quite a bit with Price Waterhouse
in their operations up in Canada.
And I think that's sort of an issue that's going to take care
of itself. I mean the companies that are going to go third party
are doing it because they want credibility. So chances are most
of them are going to go with a big name, well recognized,
credible, auditing firm. It's not going to make a lot of sense to
go to third party if nobody's heard of the firm or it has a bad
reputation.
Personal communication.
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strictly protected,"' and it owns all verification work products.3 ' The
lead verifier has final responsibility for determining conformance.0
Any findings of nonconformity must be "fully supported by the
evidence;""3 3 there is no comparable requirement for findings of
conformity. The standard seems to assume that any non-conformities
will be resolved by a schedule for conformity, which will result in a
verification of compliance.0 4 Re-verification is to occur within three
years after the first verification, and no later than every five years
30 5
thereafter.
Finally, at the end of 1999 the AF&PA announced a new
"inconsistent practices reporting protocol." The protocol allows
loggers to submit confidential reports of "perceived violations of the
SFI Standard by participants in the SFI program. 30 6 The recipient of
the reports is the secretary of the Independent Expert Review Panel,
currently an independent consultant who has been quite active in
American forest certification developments. He is to provide a
"firewall" between the report filer and all other actors, and is to
forward a report of the alleged inconsistency to the company
involved, along with a request that it investigate, take appropriate
action, and provide a written report within thirty days. The secretary
is also to notify the report filer of any outcome of the report, and to
provide a confidential summation ofthe reports filed and the recorded
outcomes to the Expert Review Panel, the SFI Executive Committee,
3D0
301
302
303

See AF&PA-2001, supranote 292, §§ 6 and 8.
See id
See id § 7.
Id § 8.

"Non-conformities shall be resolved, or recommendations shall include
a schedule for resolution of nonconformities, before any declarations of
304

conformance can be issued." Id.
305
See id.
306
SFI program Introduced Interim Inconsistent Practices Reporting

Protocol (AF&PA press release), Dec. 21, 1999, AF&PA website
<http://www.afandpa.org/news/PressReleases/SFI IP rel.html>. The program is
"interim" because eventually responsibility for handling inconsistent practices is
to be taken over by state programs.
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and the SFI National Forum.0 7 The reports apparently will not be
made public.
4. Logo
SF1 program participants (both members and licensees) are
entitled to display the new SFI logo, featuring a bear and fish circling
coniferous and deciduous trees.3"'

5. Logger Training
Rather than undertake the FSC's difficult "chain of custody"
strategy, the AF&PA is pursuing a logger education program.
Loggers supplying program participants are to be taught about the
SFI principles and indicators, best management practices for roads,
logging sites, and streamside management, regeneration methods,
Endangered Species Act requirements and other wildlife
requirements.30 9 The program is voluntary, in part because the
AF&PA argues its members would be subject to anti-trust liability if

See id.
This logo replaces a more angular one with three conifers lined up one
behind the other over a trunk with a circular arrow suggesting ecological cycles.
309
SeeAF&PA Sustainable Forestry Initiative Standard, Objective 10 (1999).
307
308
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they required supplying loggers to be trained.31° This seems a dubious
argument from a legal point of view, but the organization nonetheless
makes it. The SFI's goal is to give such training to all of the loggers
supplying SFI participants. The AF&PA reported that 29,000 loggers,
85 percent of the total, had taken such training by the end of 1998,
and that it expected to reach 100 percent'by the end of 1999. 11
6. Licensing
Like logger training, 'licensing' is an effort to extend the
reach of the SF1 program beyond SFI members. It allows nonAF&PA members to verify to the SFI Standard and to receive SFI
recognition. Upon the adoption of the licensing policy in 1998, a
number of non-profit organizations (e.g., The Conservation Fund and
Ida Cason Callaway Foundation) and public land management
agencies (e.g., the State Forests of Massachusetts and Itasca and St.
Louis Counties in Minnesota) became licensees.3" 2 According to SFI
statistics, the addition of licensee land brought the total coverage of
the SFI program to "56.5 million acres [22.6 million hectares] of
productive forest land in the U.S., more than any other sustainable
forestry program in the world. '313
7. Expert Review Panel
The AF&PA has augmented the SFI program with an eighteen
member expert review panel "representing conservation,
environmental, professional, academic, and public organizations." 314
The Panel's mission "is to provide a framework to conduct an
independent review of the SFI program and to ensure the Annual

310

31
312
313
314

Personal communications.
See SFI 1999 41 Annual Progress Report, at 8.
See Berg & Cantrell, supranote 275, at 33.
Id.

AF&PA website <http://www.afandpa.org/forestry/sfi_frame.html>.
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3 5
Report fairly states the status of SFI program implementation.""
While the panel lists only two members as representing
environmental organizations, it includes a number of academics, state
forestry officials, and past or present high level U.S. Forest Service
officials. 1 6 All in all, it appears to be a moderate panel, but it has
evidently pushed the AF&PA to attempt to measure environmental
improvements resulting from the SFI program, and possibly even to
consider spot audits of member management practices.317 The
pressure for research on actual environmental performance is
important, both to the long-term credibility of the program and to
understanding how it really operates. Given the desire of panel
members to protect and enhance their personal credibility, it seems

315
316

Id

One participant explained the structure of the panel as follows:
You know that came about as a result of initial focus group
testing that we did. You know we asked, "OK what would bring
credibility to the program. Do we need to bring national
environmental groups in? How do different organizations
outside of the industry rate in terms of public credibility?" And
it was real interesting -- and the environmental groups hate to
hear it -- but one of the findings was the public kept telling us
that environmental groups are good at identifying problems but
by and large they are not real good at arriving at solutions. And
they didn't think that we needed to bring sort of the more radical
elements of the environmental groups into the program. But
they did rate academics, state foresters, professional society and
some of the more management oriented conservation groups,
like the Conservation Fund, Nature Conservancy, high in
credibility. And that sort of led us in structuring the program to

add those groups to the expert review panel...

See Statement of Independent Expert Review Panel Chairman, Paul
Hansen, and Statement of Independent Expert Review Panel, SFI 1999 41 Annual
Progress Report, AF&PA Sustainable Forestry Initiative Program, at 3-6. Some
panel members evidently have pushed to perform on-the-ground checks on forest
practices. The AF&PA position on this issue is that "while some members of the
panel do make field visits to member companies and observe their on-the-ground
practices, it is not a charge of the panel to verify practices on the ground and the
panel does not review individual company data." AF&PA Website, supranote314.
317
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likely that a substantial number of them will continue to push for
improved research and information dissemination on SFI. Yet such
research will have to be formally designed, proposed, permitted and
financed, all difficult and time-consuming processes, which may not
be completed until it is too late to document the nature or extent of
change in management practices prompted by SFI.
C. Program Operation
1. Standard Setting
Standard setting has been largely internal to the AF&PA,
carried out by staff members working with interested corporate
executives.31 Of course they also had the FSC Principles and Criteria
to work with, as well as the larger discussion of sustainable
development and forestry spurred by the Rio process. In addition,
they were able to draw on the history of the chemical industry's bythen well-known Responsible Care Program, which had been
developed in response to the Bhopal disaster, the Rhine chemical
spill, and other disasters.319 The AF&PA tested its initial ideas on
focus groups organized by a consulting firm. 20 Their goal seems to
have been to define a program with the minimum number of elements
necessary to bolster the credibility of the American forest products
industry. Although it is less clear, it appears that another important
goal was to check possible inroads in North America by the more
stringent, non-industry-controlled FSC program. Over time, the SFI
standards have been refined, and the indicators have become a bit

318

Personal communication.

E.g., Neil Gunningham, Environment,Self-Regulation, andthe Chemical
Industry: Assessing ResponsibleCare, 17 L. & POL. 57-109 (1995).
319

320

See id,
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more demanding, as the AF&PA has taken steps to respond to critics
and to bolster the perceived credibility of its program. Such
adjustments seem likely to continue in the future, given the dynamic,
competitive arena of forest management certification.
2. Verification
The SFI program has evolved considerably beyond the simple
"trust us" system it began as. However, it still requires only selfverification to achieve compliance. Moreover, even if a firm opts for
third-party verification, the firm still retains a high degree of control
over verifiers and their plans. No research appears to exist on any
form of the verification process. Given the lack of social and policy
scientists on the Expert Review Panel, such research is unlikely to be
seen as a high priority within the SFI system. It will be interesting to
see whether enterprising outside researchers persuade the AF&PA to
support an evaluation of the verification process. Barring that,
however, we are likely to be limited to gleanings from trade journals
and self-reflective musings of practitioners for some time to come.
Implications for Environment, Human Rights, and
D.
Community
While SFI began in part as a rear-guard action to halt the
continuing decline in timber industry credibility while heading off
more stringent regulation, it nonetheless seems to represent a
significant greening of the American forest products industry. The
SFI principles to which the industry has committed would have been
almost unthinkable even a decade ago. The AF&PA strategy of
linking SFI to ISO certification also gives it considerable potential
" ' That said, much of SFI's long- term environmental effect
leverage.32

Individual companies are using this option to their advantage.
International Paper Company, one ofthe world's largest forest products companies,

321

combines ISO 14001 with SFI certification, and has enjoyed considerable positive
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will depend on the continuing viability of competitive systems such
as the FSC, as well as continuing external pressure for improved
environmental performance by the forest products industry.
Institutional pressure from the Expert Review Panel will also be
crucial. If these conditions hold, it seems likely that the program will
play a generally positive role in environmental protection for some
time to come.
An important question will be the role of SFI in defining key
terms, such as "forest health," and in defining forest management
standards generally, such as the use of clear cuts and chemicals. In
general, as noted above, SFI has sought to inject traditional or slightly
modified industry positions into the sustainable forestry debate ' espousing herbicide
rejecting "uneven age management,"322
use,
resisting old growth timber protection, defending "appropriate" clear
cuts, and generally arguing for the more intensive use of industrial
land (while tentatively allowing protection of other land). Some of
these positions may be environmentally defensible, but it will take
years to evaluate the degree to which they actually contribute to
defining sustainable forestry.
The SFI program does not address human rights. Firms need
not give any consideration to protecting indigenous property rights or
traditional land uses, for example. However, in 1996 the AF&PA
published a separate set of "Environmental, Health, and Safety
' They generally suggest
Principles."323
incorporating environmental
and worker health and safety concerns in business management
systems by: making them "priorities;" monitoring and reporting on

publicity as a result. It recently received the 2000 World Environment Center Gold
Medal for Environmental Achievement, an award that is presented by a jury of
distinguished environmentalists to only one company in the world each year. See
<http://www.wec.org>.

3n
This implies a preference for a "cropping" approach to forestry, in which
forests are made up of large areas of the same species of the same age, and are
harvested at the same time.
33
See AF&PA website,
<http://www.afandpa.org/iinfo/environmentlindex.html#Environment>.
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performance to corporate boards of directors; training employees;
supporting research; communicating "with employees, customers,
suppliers, the community, public officials, and shareholders to build
greater understanding on environmental, health, and safety matters;"
and participating in policymaking.324 On the whole, these principles
take an ISO-like tone. They urge firms to consider many factors and
develop programs, but set few substantive criteria. These principles
have not received the publicity the SFI ones have, and it is impossible
to know how much influence they might have on AF&PA members.
The SFI program also mimics the ISO system by making
communities tangential to the system, and centering it on the firm and
forestry profession. Firms undertake no substantive duties to assist
indigenous communities or protect local employment, and no
procedural duties beyond outreach and education. The term
"community" appears only twice in the SFI Principles and Objectives,
both times referring to "the forestry community. ,325 Thus, geographic
communities are at most passive beneficiaries of good forest
management by businesses and professionals in the SFI system.326
V. Conclusions.
A. Patterns of Private Environmental Regulation
The private regulatory programs described above show a
number of shared and striking patterns. They were all created by
groups of self-selected standard setters with relatively low levels of
government and public involvement. They invoke the public interest
and seek to position their participants as its trustees. They promulgate
324
325

Id
AF&PA website,

<http:llwww.afandpa.orglforesatry/sfiI2000sfistandard.html>.
326
The AF&PA website does list "increased involvement in community
forestry activities including outreach and training" as one of the benefits
however.
SFI
program,
the
of
<http:llwww.afandpa.org/forestry/sfi/sfireport.cfin#doingwell>.
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law-like texts to define their missions and to organize and legitimate
their behavior. They rely heavily on expertise in interpreting and
implementing their programs. They evidently assume that good
principles combined with professional expertise provide solid
foundations for the legitimacy of their programs.
The programs also rely on common organizational strategies,
often copied from one another. Within the standard setting
organizations, these include decision making based on formal
constitutions and procedural rules, and organizational control based
on contracts and auditing mechanisms. Beyond the standard setting
organizations, more importantly, the programs seek to aggrandize the
organizational capacities of the regulated entities. They do this by
attempting to commit elements of firms' management systems to
program goals and by monitoring the workings of the management
systems. They also rely heavily on the production, analysis, and
monitoring of information, combined with re-analysis and adaptation.
To differing degrees, they share an implicit commitment to the
proposition that improved information will lead to both
organizational leaming and improved control of organizational
impacts on the environment. This approach to organizational control
appears to be a significant step beyond the "traditional" concept of
regulation represented by a simple performance rule to be met
however the regulated organization chooses. In general, the systems
also show a pattern of increasing stress on credible application and
monitoring of standards (certification, auditing, verification, etc.).
Based on the experiences ofpublic regulatory bureaucracies in trying
to maintain public credibility, this is a tendency that can be expected
to continue.
Another common organizational strategy in the private
environmental programs is the building of network alliances with
other organizations to maximize the regulatory capacity of the
programs. The FSC's key alliances are with environmental NGOs3 27
Most environmental NGOs can be expected to back FSC in opposition to
the other certification programs. However, many are still wary of certification
327
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and buyers groups, as well as with FSC certified producers and
sellers. 328 The ISO's key alliances are with transnational corporations
and the World Trade Organization, the emergent arbiter of regulation
in international trade.329 The AF&PA's central alliances are with the
developed North American forestry production and manufacturing
network and the forestry profession generally, whose support or
opposition it can plausibly claim to be able to deliver to sustainable
forestry programs. These networks are interrelated to some extent, of
course, and some actors participate in several. However, they are also
in competition with each other, and potentially with governments.
The relationships of governments to these networks remain only
partly worked out. While the private standard setting organizations
have generally tried to avoid the strictures and entanglements of
working with governments, effective government policy frameworks
are thought by many commentators to be very important to the

programs generally, and fear that they will turn into a form of backsliding as
governments focus their attention on other areas over time. Personal
communications.
328

It has also recently formed an alliance with five other social and

environmental certification organizations. See Public Statement: Safeguarding
Environmental and Social Issues in Trade (circulated by Patrick Mallet, Falls Brook

Centre, Canada, December 20, 1999). The other participating organizations are:
"Council on Economic Priorities Accreditation Agency (CEPAA)
"Fairtrade Labelling Organizations (FLO) International
"International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM)
"International Organic Accreditation Service (IOAS)
" Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)

Their announcement includes goals such as "an analysis of accreditation procedures
leading to a common framework; a peer review process for accreditation that will
enhance the transparency of these organisations; research on the overlap of

standards between systems and a strategy for increasing compatibility;
development ofjoint training programs; and further discussions on trademark use
and logo proliferation."
329
See Matthias Finger &Ludivine Tamiotti, The EmergingLinkagebetween
the WTO and the ISO: Implicationsfor Developing Countries(1999) (draft paper
on file with author).
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effective operation of certification systems.33 ° Conversely,
certification programs could prove important allies to government
policies, and governments are increasingly participating in and
relying on them.33 '
The programs also share important substantive
commonalities. Most important is the general goal of sustainable
development, to which they all profess commitment.332 They are
locked in an intense competition, however, to define what sustainable
development will mean in practice, and who will benefit in the near
term. As part of this process, the programs show a "mimicry"
dynamic, in which they borrow many of each other's elements and
terms, but also seek to achieve strategic variation by offering different
definitions of key terms and concepts. While this probably makes
sense within the programs, it has the potential to foster considerable
confusion outside them, potentially undermining them all.333
B. Causes of Private Environmental Regulation
At a recent conference of the International Forestry Students
Association, a panel of experts was asked to explain the rise of forest

330

E.g., Bass & Simula, supranote 5, at 34-35; Webb, supranote 262, at 43;

Meidinger, IncorporatingCertificationSystems, supra note 132.
331
E.g., P.N. Grabosky, Green Markets: EnvironmentalRegulation by the
Private Sector, 16 L & POL. 419 (1994). Meidinger, IncorporatingCertification
Systems, supranote 132.
332
See note 29 infra.
333
See Wilson, Uneasy Partnerships,supra note 48. Wilson portrays a

situation of "copycat programs that mimic environmentally sound ones in watered
down form" Id. See also Bass & Simula, supra note 5, at 33. For a general
discussion ofmimicry dynamics in environmental law, see William R. Rodgers, Jr.,
Deception, Self-Deception, and Myth: Evaluating Long-Term Environmental
Settlements, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 567 (1995), and William R. Rodgers, Jr.,
Deception, Self-Deception, and Mythology: The Law of Salmon in the Pacific
Northwest, 26 PAC. L.J. 821 (1995).
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certification. 34 They cited three main reasons. The first was the
continuing decline of the world's forests, particularly in tropical
countries, but also in old growth regions of developed countries such
as the US and Canada. The second was the accompanying loss of
public confidence in both the forest industry and government over the
last several decades. The third was fear of economic losses by both
management and labor. While these factors offer the most concise
possible explanation of the rise of certification at a common sense
level, they do not seem to shed much light on the fundamental
dynamics that may be involved. Several theoretical perspectives help
make sense of the growth of private standard setting.
First, it is plausible to argue that the programs described
above represent a natural, possibly evolutionary process for working
out the meaning of policy goals such as sustainable development and
ecosystem health.335 These ideas can be seen as "master metaphors"
having inherent appeal and power. Competition between the systems
to give meaning to them is natural, since profound normative
decisions are involved and the master metaphors are far from selfdefining.336 The growing importance of information and the reliance
on expertise also make sense, since equally profound scientific and
technical problems are involved.
It is quite reasonable to be suspicious of policy evolution
arguments, however. On one hand, more information than in the past
is produced by each of the private regulatory programs. On the other,
it is less readily available than would be the case with most modem
government regulatory programs. Moreover, certain issues,
particularly of social justice, get lost in some of the private programs.
Arguably, the ISO and AF&PA programs both operate to mute social
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See Meetings of the International Forestry Students Association,

University of Freiburg, Germany (Sept. 17, 1999).
335
See Giandomenico Majone & Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation as
Evolution, 2 POL. STUD. R. ANN. 103 (1978).

See Margaret A. Shannon et al., ScienceAdvocacy is Inevitable:Deal with
It (Proceedings of the Society of Am. Foresters, 1996).
336
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justice concerns, and to de-link them from the environment. These
factors raise a second, more traditionally "political" explanation: each
of the programs represents a political agenda, and relative political
power, rather than social merit, is likely to determine their ultimate
success. While political power is obviously an important variable in
understanding certification, much of the research on political
dynamics completed to date seems to suggest that the certification
arena involves new dynamics which are not well understood in terms
of traditional political power frameworks.337 While it is far from clear
why this might be the case, possible explanations include: the effort
to use the market as a political arena; constraints imposed by the
widespread acceptance of environmental protection as an inherent
social goal, and the fact that nation states are not the primary targets
of certification politics.
The relative absence of governments from the new regulatory
programs raises questions in its own right. One possible explanation
is that offered by the environmental NGOs in explaining their
decision to set up the FSC: governments had been so ineffective in
pursuing the goals of the Rio accords that it was worth establishing
an alternative system.338 There are several possible explanations for
government inactivity. First, governments have faced continuing
resource shortages and legitimacy problems in the past two decades,
limiting their ability to do much at all. In such circumstances it makes
sense for governments to devote their scarce resources to more
pressing problems, and ones for which private resources are not
available.339 Second, there are good reasons to think that governments
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E.g., Hoberg, supranote 99; Elliott, Forest Certification, supra note 8.
See Elliott, Forest Certification, supranote 8, at 107.

This theory is also consistent with the fact that private initiatives have
developed in a number of other areas, including occupational health and safety (see
Theo Nichols & Eric Tucker, Occupational Health and Safety Management
Systems in the United Kingdom and Ontario, Canada: A Political Economy
Perspective, (No. 21 in the Working Paper Series for the Centre for Research on
Work and Society, March 1999)), human rights (see Cassel, supra note 135, and
Liubicic, supra note 135), and other areas of environmental protection. There is,
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are inherently more cumbersome policymaking organizations, given
their complex procedural rules 4 ' and the capacity of negotiations
over other issues to block agreement in areas where there is general
consensus. This is especially true when numerous governments are
involved, as is necessarily the case in global standard setting. These
factors can be combined into a kind of "transactions costs"
explanation of the growth of private regulatory policymaking:
stakeholders can avoid multiple inefficiencies of working through
governments by establishing separate vertically and horizontally
integrated programs with fewer conflicting interests than
governments. 4' Such programs can take advantage of government
policies and legal provisions while avoiding their more cumbersome
features.
A transactions cost approach might also help explain the
willingness of firms to participate in the programs. Private standards
are easier to negotiate than government ones. Also, standardization
reduces the costs of doing business. Finally, the programs help reduce
public and private liability of corporations and their directors.
C. Prospects of the Private Environmental Regulatory Programs
Whether one applies a policy evolution, political power, or
transaction cost perspective significantly affects how one sees the
for example, the Marine Stewardship Council which closely parallels the Forest
Stewardship Council. Recently Unilever, owner of the Gorton and Birdseye frozen
foods brands, agreed to buy only from Marine Stewardship Council certified
suppliers by 2005. See Wilson, Uneasy Partnerships,supra note 48.
340
This is not to say that such procedural rules are undesirable. They have

many justifications based on avoiding bad decisions and giving interested parties
a chance to offer relevant information and comments.
341
The idea of using transactions costs to understand the forms taken by
social organizations was pioneered by Coase, supra note 60. Its application to
public policy frameworks has been rather limited, although Douglass North has
applied it very broadly to understanding economic institutions. See DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

(1990).
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future prospects of the private environmental regulatory programs.
Viewed from a benign evolutionary perspective, the programs are
essentially complementary, all sailing down the same broad river of
public discourse which no doubt flows toward sustainable
development and social justice. As noted above, competition is not
inconsistent with this thesis, since it is a common way of defining
public ideals. From political power and transactions costs
perspectives, however, the systems are competing not just to define
norms, but to become long-term institutions for shaping public
policy. If that is the case, then organizational resources, among other
things, are likely to be central to their success or failure. Table 1
suggests some of the resources that probably would be key and makes
rough comparisons among the programs. If all the factors are given
equal weight, then the ISO has the clear advantage. However, the
weights of the factors are likely to be dynamic, particularly
environmental credibility and the capacity to invoke government.
Moreover, even if one takes a political power or transaction cost
perspective, one cannot discount the importance of actual
environmental performance, and that remains to be determined.
Thus, although it is clear that these programs and others will
be in competition with-each other, it is not possible to predict a
particular outcome. It could take one of several forms. First, one
program could simply triumph and become a generally accepted
world standard, possibly incorporating advantageous features of other
programs. Second, the competing programs could create a situation
of hopeless mass confusion, constantly undermining and eventually
destroying each other. Third, they could continue to mutate and
possibly merge into a set of joint ventures. Because each of the
programs has significant weaknesses, and because several of them
explicitly provide for linkages, this seems to be a likely possibility and there have been some moves in this direction.342 But then again,
The British FSC, for example, has recognized the program of the Woodlot
Owners Association (See Bass & Simula, supra note 5, at 33). FSC International
342

is currently engaged in discussions with the Indonesian national certification
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the programs are also at odds with each other, and it may be in the
interest ofat least some of the programs not to have any single system
emerge. This state of affairs could be roughly analogous to the
persistence of separate national legal systems despite their gradual
convergence toward highly similar substantive requirements.343
FSC

ISO

AF&PA

Organizational
Capacity

Low

High

High

Funding and Resources

Low

High

High

Expertise and
Knowledge

Medium

High

High

Environmental
Credibility

High

Medium/
Low

Low

Capacity to Invoke
Government

Unclear

High-

Low/
Medium

Table 1. Comparative Strengths of the Systems

program, the Indonesian Eco-Labelling Institute (LEI). The organizations have

agreed to work toward mutual recognition, though that has not occurred. As an
intermediate step, FSC has agreed to incorporate indicators and criteria developed
by LEI in FSC certification proceedings. See GTZ, Newsletter, supra note 162, at
5. Efforts to achieve a merger between FSC Canada and the Canadian Standards
Association program, which is roughly comparable to SFI, failed after a number
of attempts in the mid-1990s. See Elliot, Forest Certification, supranote 8, at 31012.
343
I am indebted to David Westbrook for this suggestion.
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D. Important Questions
The above discussion ofprospects does not imply that private
environmental regulatory programs are immune from effective
analysis and critique. Indeed, how they fare over time is likely to
depend significantly on how they are understood to affect society and
the environment. The programs face a number of significant
questions. The first set, concerning their effects on environment,
human rights, and community, were probed in the body of the article.
It reached the general conclusion that all of the programs are likely to
lead to environmental improvements in the near and mid term, but
that only the FSC program would bring significant gains to human
rights and community. The ISO and AF&PA programs seek to delink those issues from environment. On their own terms they operate
to narrow the forums for human rights and community mobilization.
However, because human rights are pursued in many arenas by many
organizations, it is not clear that they will operate to reduce human
rights or consideration for communities in forest management. It is
clear, however, that any gains the ISO and AF&PA programs might
bring to human rights and community concerns will be limited to the
indirect consequences of improved environmental management.
1. Equity
Private environmental regulatory programs face a number of
difficult and increasingly important questions of social equity.
Certification programs are ofcourse designed to discriminate between
desirable and undesirable industry practices. Problems arise, however,
because undesirable practices may be correlated with other features
of the social landscape which the programs do not necessarily wish
to discriminate against - such as how small a firm is, or whether it is
located in a developing country. Equity issues such as these are likely
to become more apparent and important in the next few years, and
certification programs will probably have to focus an
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increasing amount of their deliberative capacity on them. The issues
come in two general, often interrelated forms: disparate outcomes and
disparate participation in decision making.'"
Outcome issues include the following. First, because they are
relatively technocratic and management-intensive, certification
programs have a built-in tendency to favor large companies, which
enjoy economies of scale in employing specialists, implementing
information systems, and the like. Large companies also generally
enjoy superior access to information about existing and likely
certification requirements, to the investment capital often necessary
to meet them, and to markets in industrialized countries. Companies
with integrated production, distribution, and retail systems are likely
to be much more successful in profiting from certified products than
those involved only in production, since any "premium" paid for
certified products comes from the ultimate consumer. Thus there have
been some indications that primary producers in developing countries
often receive no price advantage in selling certified wood.34
Second, and perhaps more vexingly, the stricter that
environmental standards become, the greater the disparity between
the abilities of large, sophisticated corporations and small, often third
world businesses to meet them. Certification systems tend to favor
bureaucratic over traditional management systems, forests with
developed management policies over ones that are just being brought
under organized forestry, forests with clearly worked out tenure
systems over those with unsettled ones, and quite possibly production

344

These issues were perceptively sketched in Chris Elliott & Virgilio M.

Viana, PotentialInequalitiesandUnintendedEffects of Certification, in VIRGILIO
VIANA ET AL., CERTIFICATION OF FOREST PRODUCTS: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES

(1996). They are more fully explored in Thomber, Equity andCertification,supra
note 18. Both articles make most of the points mentioned in this section. It should
also be noted that although the certification programs face these issues, they are not
fundamentally different from public regulatory agencies in this regard. Any
transnational public regulatory program would be at least as afflicted by equity
problems.
34S

See Elliott & Viana, supra note 344.
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forests over "natural" ones. 346 They also favor forests managed solely
for wood production, and have a hard time dealing with mixed landuse, rural livelihood systems combining farming and forestry.34 7
Timber harvested from lands converted from forestry to agriculture
is not eligible for certification, even though conversion might be
appropriate in many developing countries.3 4 The great majority of
accredited certifiers in all systems are based in northern countries.3 49
The knowledge base for achieving certification standards has largely
been developed in northern countries, and is most readily accessible
there.3 " All of the favored elements are disproportionately located in
developed countries and the disfavored ones in developing countries.
In sum, these factors add up to considerable advantage for
actors in developed countries over those in southern countries. These
concerns are currently the focus of much discussion in forest
certification circles. The FSC, for example, has convened an effort to
make certification more accessible to small businesses. 351 An
underlying purpose of that effort is to make it more accessible to
tropical countries. There is also a considerable amount of discussion
in certification circles regarding whether initial standards for
certification should be made lower in developing countries, with the
expectation that they would be raised as the capacity to meet them

346

What constitutes a "natural" forest is a difficult question in itself. For

present purposes, it is sufficient to say that it is a forest that has not been devoted
to organized timber production.
347
See Thomber, Equity and Certification,supranote 18, at 22-23.
348
See id.at 20.
349
See supratext accompanying notes 35-37. As implied above, there may

also be hidden, "micro-equity" problems because of disparate application of
standards by different certifiers, but evidence on this issue isvery limited and will
take some time to develop.
350
Thornber also notes that few incentives work in favor of widespread
sharing of knowledge, although some certifiers are now trying to facilitate the
sharing of knowledge. See Thornber, EquityandCertification,supranote 18, at 3839.
351
See Scrase, supra note 52. See also discussion infra at notes 53-60.
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rose.352 It is not easy to explain how this policy would fit with the
principle of a uniform standard for all forests, however. Thus, solving
these problems will be a difficult and extended process.
The process will be more difficult because most ofmost of the
decisional processes in certification programs are dominated by the
same interests that receive the most benefit from them - large
enterprises based in and seeking to satisfy consumers in northern
countries. This is not uniformly the case, of course. The FSC, in
particular, has established its headquarters in Mexico, gives equal
power to social, environmental, and economic interests, and has
restructured itself to give equal power to northern and southern
interests. Most ofits core policies, however, were formed when it was
dominated more by northern interests. Even now, both the social
chamber and the south can be characterized as severely
underrepresented.353 The FSC represents the best case for equity of
the major private certifiers. While the ISO has many developing
country members, they tend to participate less and to be less effective
in policymaking and standard setting than those from developed
countries. The AF&PA does not include either small businesses or
developing countries in its decision making processes. Its European
counterpart, the PEFC, incorporates small businesses, but still limits
decision making to northern interests.
Given the overall incentives for environmental certification
systems to operate on a global scale, it seems essential for them to
incorporate effectively both developed and developing countries.
Many of the equity issues noted above are likely to be central to that
process. But it is hard to say for sure. Two of the three systems
discussed in this article are not overly concerned with equity issues,
and there is no obvious reason to assume they are making a serious

E.g., Bass & Simula, supra note 5, at 27; Thornber, Equity and
Ceritification,supranote 18, at 19-20.
353
In September 1999, only 17% of FSC members were in the social
chamber, and only 27% of the total membership was from the south. See Thornber,
Equity and Certification,supranote 18, at 34.
352
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mistake. Given the market-driven elements of certification, they may
simply be betting that consumer demand will focus more on the
physical quality of the production environment than on its social
quality. This remains to be seen. If there is indeed a larger sense of
justice at work here, which is not satisfied through other mechanisms,
then they may indeed be wrong." 4
2. Law
Although the private environmental regulatory systems
discussed in this article are officially separate from formal legal
systems, they necessarily interact with them, and are likely to do so
increasingly in the future. This is so because private regulatory
programs are essentially parallel regulatory systems. The standards
they set and the institutions they create can augment, displace, or
conflict with legal regulation. Governments will therefore have to
make choices regarding how to deal with private regulatory systems.
They could ignore them, of course. But even if they do, private
standards are likely to bleed into legal systems through such avenues
as best management practices requirements in regulatory systems, tort
liability standards, truth in advertising laws, suits for
misrepresentation, equitable judicial remedies for regulatory
violations, and the like.355
It is interesting to note that the individual principles,
standards, and criteria used in the private regulatory systems seem
markedly different from the rules typically produced by public
regulatory systems. They do not seek to define acceptable and
unacceptable behavior in nearly as much detail, nor to eliminate as
much of the appearance of discretion, as public regulatory rules

354
For an prescient exposition on the potential power of perceptions of
justice, see EDMOND CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1964). The recent literature

on environmental justice is voluminous, and cannot be represented here.
355
For preliminary reviews, see Webb, supra note 262; Meidinger,
IncorporatingCertificationSystems, supranote 132.
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typically do. They explicitly allow for professional judgment and
balancing in site specific conditions. This may give them a significant
advantage in complex environments where new information is
constantly being produced and alternative management strategies
proposed.
Because of their potentially higher performance requirements
and greater adaptability, privately set standards could be attractive to
government legal systems, which could adopt either specific
standards or entire certification systems, and make them obligatory.
In doing so, they might have to choose one system over the
alternatives. Either in conjunction with such a move, or separately,
governments could undertake to regulate the operations of the private
regulatory systems, setting requirements for rule-making,
enforcement, certifier qualifications, and the like."5 6
It is also possible that significant conflicts will emerge
between private standard systems and governmentally based laws.
The most immediate potential for such conflict is in the rapidly
changing area of international trade law. Treaties administered by the
World Trade Organization seek to eliminate "non-tariff barriers to
trade." Particularly suspect are rules distinguishing among "like"
products based on how they were produced, which is arguably what
the environmental certification systems do. Although the primary
targets of the international trade laws are governmentally set
standards, there is serious discussion about whether and when
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Meidinger, Incorporating Certification Systems, supra note 132;

Rametsteiner, supra note 129, at 199-203. It is worth noting that many other
certification systems are regulated by governments. The Department of Agriculture,
for example, is in the process of promulgating new standards for organic foods.
<http:llwww.ams.usda.gov/nop>. On the other hand, it is also true that regulating
in this area can be very tricky, as the FTC discovered when it attempted to regulate
advertising for "natural" and "organic" foods in the 1970s. See Barry Boyer,
FundingPublic Participationin Agency Proceedings: The FTCExperience, 70
GEORGETOWN L. J. 51-172 (1981).
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privately developed standards should be addressed.357 Moreover, as
noted above, private standards are likely to infuse public ones in
various ways, and as they do they are more likely to come under
WTO strictures. Not all private standards appear equally vulnerable
to international trade laws, however. The WTO has conferred a
presumptive acceptability and preference on the ISO system,
primarily on grounds that every trading country can participate in the
standard setting process and that resultant standards are consensual.358
Accordingly, the other private systems are at a disadvantage vis a viz
the ISO system, and may experience significant pressures to align
themselves with it.
Nationally based trade regulation laws also have some
potential to create problems for private regulatory systems, as noted
in the discussion of the AF&PA's logger training program.35 9 The
U.S. antitrust laws, for example, prohibit "every contract,
combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint oftrade or commerce" and
all attempts and conspiracies to "monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce" as well as successful monopolization without defining
key terms such as "restraint oftrade" or "monopolize."36 Because the
standard setting systems seek to channel trade to certified businesses,
restraint of trade allegations are possible. It does not appear likely,
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E.g., Webb, supra note 262, at 40-41. See also Natural Resources and

Ethical Trade Program, Forest Certification in the Eyes of the World Trade
Organisation: (implications of the Seattle Round),

<http://www.nri.org/NRET/P WB/et l-O.htm>.
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See supratext accompanying note 310.
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however, that the systems as currently constituted will face serious
anti-trust problems. 6 ' Indeed, it appears that they have been alert to
potential problems and tried to avoid them. 62
In addition, as noted above, private inspection and
certification systems face challenges of consistency and reliability
363
which have been major problems for public regulatory systems. If
it turns out over time that there are significant differences between
operations certified as being comparable, for example, then legal suits
for misrepresentation are possible, setting up a number of discrete
conflicts between private regulation and legal systems, and
potentially triggering efforts by public legal systems to regulate
private ones.3 4
Finally, certification programs entail some potentially
fascinating experiments in grand legal theory. In attempting to
incorporate environmental, human rights, community, and economic
values in a single set of globally applicable standards, for example,
the FSC would seem to be assuming that it is possible to do so. Few
modem legal scholars would be so bold. Most would assume that the
complexities ofthe world andtensions among the incorporated values
must eventually force fractures and consequent political choices.3 65
Still, it will be interesting to see where this intrepid experiment of
optimistic environmentalists and social reformers may lead.
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3. Democracy
The possibility that private standard setting may amount to a
form of non-governmental law making leads directly to questions of
democratic legitimacy. The private systems operate largely outside
governmental law-making systems. Many of them work on a
transnational level, thereby racing around governmental processes
usually used to test the legitimacy of regulatory concepts and
practices. These developments inevitably shift decisional power from
some sectors of society to others, though which ones will actually
enjoy increased influence depends in part on how private standard
setting fares in the future. Depending on which system prevails,
different types of interests will enjoy increased power. If the ISO
system prevails, for example, it seems clear that transnational
corporations will probably have succeeded in expanding their role in
public governance. If the FSC system prevails, environmental groups
and other social interests will enjoy increased power. All of the
scenarios seem to benefit professional experts. At this stage of their
development, private regulatory systems do not seem to bode well for
public participation. Even if participation has never been what it was
cracked up to be in governmental regulatory systems, most of the
private systems purposely constrict participation and make it
secondary to business and professional decision making.
Even if these developments are occurring, their implications
for democracy are not self-evident. One view is that private
environmental regulatory initiatives are efforts by narrow interests to
short-circuit political processes, seize control of the standard setting
agenda, and close off probing public review and critique of the
standards as implemented.366 Thus, stakeholder groups are
strategically chosen, decisions made, and then the process "goes
public" only after key issues are off the table. Conversely, it is
possible to argue that the growth of private standard setting is not
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(1997).
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anti-democratic. First, most governmental systems are no more
democratic in practice than some of the certification systems.
Second, the very existence of the new systems reflects widespread
social agreement on fundamental principles. Private regulation is
simply an efficient mechanism for implementing goals established
through democratic processes. Not everyone can participate in
regulatory decision making in any case, and these systems can be
seen as including, or seeking to include, the participants necessary to
adequately serve society's interests. Moreover, the fact that private
standard setting processes might compete to some extent with public
ones is not bad. Controlling who makes a decision is no guarantee of
a good, or even a democratic decision except in a purely formal
theory of democracy. Social deliberation always occurs in many
forums other than government, and it may be good for governmental
regulatory systems to have to compete with non-governmental ones.
Thus society at large might be understood as running a competition
among regulatory systems,367 and the debate they are conducting
might be understood as an expansive social dialogue on how forests
should be managed. 6
Determining which of these views of democratic legitimacy
should prevail will itself require a broad public debate. That debate
must be informed by expertise and a considerable amount of
independent research, but cannot be limited to the narrow
communities represented by the private regulatory systems described
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course, this process itself could reflect a major institutional reconflguration, which
itself will need to be understood.
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in this article. The debate will take time, and may not even have
begun as this article is published. It might very well reach the
conclusion, based on watching the systems develop for a while, that
the certification programs were a good thing in their first decade, but
need to be reshaped by other social institutions in their second.

